Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1996

Macris & Associates Inc v. Images & Attitude Inc :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Dennis K. Poole; Andrea Nuffer; Dennis K. Poole and Associates; Attorneys for Appellant.
Stephen T. Hard; Roger D. Sandack; Steven E. McCowin; Giauque, Crockett, Bendinger and
Peterson.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Macris & Associates Inc v. Images & Attitude Inc, No. 960218 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/157

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
IN THE UTAH COURT OF {AfTgALS
%Q

MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC.,

DOCKET NO.

w

Plaintiff and Appellee,
COURT OF APPEALS
NO. 960218-CA

-vsIMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., a Utah
corporation, and THOMAS MOWER, an
individual,
Defendants and Appellant.
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC.,
Third-Party Plaintiff and
Appellant,
-vs-

TRIAL COURT NO. 910400358
MIKE MACRIS,
Third-Party Defendant and
Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL COURT
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE JUDGE GUY R. BURNINGHAM, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION NO. 15
DENNIS K. POOLE
(2625)
ANDREA NUFFER
(6623)
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C,
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
STEPHEN T. HARD
(1359)
ROGER D. SANDACK
(2856)
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, BENDINGER & PETERSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee
First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

FILED
SEP 2 6 1996

COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC.,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
COURT OF APPEALS
NO. 960218-CA

-vsIMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., a Utah
corporation, and THOMAS MOWER, an
individual,
Defendants and Appellant.
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC.,
Third-Party Plaintiff and
Appellant,
-vs-

TRIAL COURT NO. 910400358
MIKE MACRIS,
Third-Party Defendant and
Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL COURT
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE JUDGE GUY R. BURNINGHAM, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION NO. 15
DENNIS K. POOLE
(2625)
ANDREA NUFFER
(6623)
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
STEPHEN T. HARD
(1359)
ROGER D. SANDACK
(2856)
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, BENDINGER & PETERSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee
First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

TABLE OF CONTENTS
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

10

ARGUMENT
I.

13
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
DISMISSING IMAGES' CLAIM FOR FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT
ON THE BASIS OF RES JUDICATA
A.

B.

C.

II.

14

Collateral Estoppel Does Not Bar Images From
Claiming Fraudulent Inducement Regarding the
Maoris & Associates Addendum

17

Summary Judgment in a Prior Arbitration
Proceeding Does Not Constitute Full and Fair
Litigation

19

The Former Arbitration Proceeding Did Not
Address Macris' Representation
Regarding
Advertising

21

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT THE COMPETITIVE
ACTIVITIES OF MICHAEL MACRIS WERE NOT ATTRIBUTABLE
TO MACRIS & ASSOCIATES CONSTITUTE CLEAR ERROR. . . 22
A.

Images Specifically Challenges Twelve of the
Trial Court's Findings of Fact

22

B.

The Evidence Marshalled On Appeal Is Insufficient to Support the Trial Court's Findings. . 25

C.

The Trial Court's Conclusions of Law, To the
Extent Based Upon A Tacit Finding That Macris
Was Not An Agent for Macris & Associates, Are
Incorrect

31

The Trial Court's Conclusion That Macris &
Associates Is Not The Alter Ego of Macris Is
Erroneous

34

D.

i

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
REFUSING TO ALLOW IMAGES TO CALL WILLIAM CRISMON, A
WITNESS LISTED ON BOTH PLAINTIFF'S AND DEFENDANT'S
WITNESS LIST

37

A.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By
Excluding William Crismon From Testifying. . . 39

B.

Macris & Associates Would Not Have Been
Prejudiced Had William Crismon Been Allowed To
Testify

CONCLUSION

39
41

APPENDIX
Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment

A-l

Stipulation on Supplementing Witness lists

A-4

Order on Supplementing Witness lists

A-6

Defendant Images's Supplemental Response to Plaintiff's
Third Set of Interrogatories to Defendant

A-8

Memorandum Decision

A-12

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

A-22

Judgment

A-39

Plaintiff's Exhibit 8, Letter dated March 7, 1991 . . . A-47
Defendant's Exhibit 79, Letter dated March 14, 1991 . . A-48
Defendant's Exhibit 39, Letter dated March 19, 1991 . . A-50
Plaintiff's Exhibit 12, Letter dated March 29, 1991 . . A-52
Defendant's Exhibit 93, Proforma

A-54

Defendant's Exhibit 94, Proforma

A-56

APPfcAL BRT (AN/MAC RIS)

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Barrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R., 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah App.
1992)
2, 38, 39, 40
Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 248 (Utah App. 1987)

17

Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1056 (Utah 1989)

32

Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Utah 1991)
Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah App. 1987)

....

1
35

Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands, 886 P.2d 514,
519 (Utah 1994)
2
Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 293 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (Utah App.
1996)
14
De Baritault v. Salt Lake City Corp. 913 P.2d 743, 744 (Utah
1996)
14
Eclat, Inc. f/k/a Images v. Affinity, Inc.

4

Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 499 (Utah App. 1994)
35
Garland v. Fleischmann, 831 P.2d 107, 110 (Utah 1992) . . . .

32

Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989)
25
Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993)

. 14

Hunsaker v. State, 870 P.2d 893, 896 (Utah 1993)

1

Jackson v. Righter, 891 P.2d 1387, 1391 (Utah 1995)

32

Lane V. Messer, 731 P.2d 488, 490 (Utah 1986)

32

Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 857 P.2d 263, 265 (Utah App. 1993)
14
Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132, 133 (Utah 1992)

14

Pasker, Gould, Ames & Weaver, Inc. v. Morse, 887 P.2d 872, 875
(Utah App. 1994)
2

APPEAL BRF (AN/MAC RIS)

iii

Plonkev v. Superior, 475 P.2d 492, 494 (Ariz. 1970)

2

Rocky Mtn. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d
459 (Utah 1989)
20
S e w v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 632 (Utah 1995) . . 16
Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990)

2

State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545 (Utah 1996)
State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990)

25
...

Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Utah 1993) rev'd
grounds,
297 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Aug. 13, 1996)
White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994)

25, 26
on

other
17, 21
1

STATUTES
U.R.C.P. 52(a) (1995)
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(k) (1995 Supp.)

2
1

OTHER AUTHORITIES
3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency

APPEAL BRF (AN/MAtRIS)

§ 320 (1986)

iv

32

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This

appeal

is

taken

from

a

final

Judgment

dated

September 14, 1995 and an earlier Order dated February 18, 1994 of
the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of
Utah.

This case was assigned to the Court of Appeals.

The Utah

Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(k) (1995 Supp.).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in

dismissing Images' claim for fraudulent inducement on the basis of
res

judicata

(R. 284-86; 732, 1017, 1251).

A trial court's grant

of a motion for summary judgment is a matter of law which is
reviewed for correctness.

White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P. 2d 1371,

1374 (Utah 1994) (citing Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d
1037, 1039 (Utah 1991); Hunsaker v. State, 870 P.2d 893, 896 (Utah
1993)).
II.

Whether

the trial court erroneously

found that

Michael Macris' activities in supplying nail gels directly to
Images

distributors

and

in commencing

the organization

of a

competing company to Images, while President and the sole employee
of Macris & Associates, were not attributable to Macris as an agent
or representative of Macris & Associates, and whether the trial
court erroneously concluded that Macris & Associates was not the
alter ego of Michael Macris

(R. 290-92, 4668-85, 4749-74, 4845-80,

4977-5094, 5526-83, 5611-12, 5614-21, 5626-27).

APPEAL.BRF (AN/MACRJS)
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A trial court's

findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard
while the court's conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness.
U.R.C.P. 52(a) (1995); Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State
Lands, 886 P.2d 514, 519 (Utah 1994) (clearly erroneous standard);
Pasker# Gould, Ames & Weaver, Inc. v. Morse, 887 P.2d 872, 875
(Utah App. 1994) (conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness);
Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990).
III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by
refusing to allow Images to call William Crismon, a witness listed
on both Plaintiff's and Defendant's witness list in Images' case in
chief

(R. 2611, 4921-40).

decision

This Court reviews a trial court's

to exclude a witness

standard.

under an abuse

of

discretion

"Excluding a witness from testifying is, however,

'extreme in nature and . . . should be employed only with caution
and restraint.'"

Barrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R., 830 P.2d

291, 293 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Plonkev v. Superior, 475 P.2d
492, 494 (Ariz. 1970).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, AND RULES
The determinative statutes, rules and constitutional provisions are set forth in the addendum where not set forth fully in
the body of this brief.

APPEAL.BRF (AN/MACRIS)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Complaint in this action was filed by Macris &
Associates on April 17, 1991 alleging, among other claims, breach
of an Addendum to Distributor Application ("Addendum"), and breach
of the Distributor Application (the "Distributorship Agreement")
(R. 8) . Macris & Associates filed a Second Amended Complaint on
the 9th of June, 1992 which likewise included claims for breach of
the Addendum and breach of the Distributorship Agreement (R. 169) .
Images filed an Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party
Complaint on the 17th of June, 1991 (R. 52) and thereafter an
Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint on the 9 th of
September, 1992 against Macris & Associates and Michael Macris
which included among other claims that Macris & Associates breached
the agreements with Images; Macris & Associates was the alter ego
of Michael Macris; and Michael Macris fraudulently induced Images
into entering into the agreement with Macris & Associates (R. 293) .
Prior to trial, Macris & Associates filed a motion for
summary judgment seeking dismissal of the fraudulent inducement
claim supported by:

(i) Macris & Associates, Inc.'s and Mike

Macris' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
Against Images & Attitude, Inc. and Thomas Mower Re:

Fraudulent

Inducement, Interference with Contractual and Economic Relations,
Defamation and Breach of Contract

(R. 661); and (ii) Macris &

Associates, Inc's and Mike Macris' Reply Memorandum in Support of
Their Motion For Summary Judgment for Images' Breach of Contract,

APPEAL BRJ- (AN/MAC RIS)
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and in Support of their Motions for Summary Judgment Re:
Ego,

Alter

Fraudulent Inducement, Interference with contractual and

Economic Relations, Defamation and Breach of Contract (R. 811) .
Images opposed the motion for summary judgment as set forth in its
(i) Memorandum in Opposition to Macris & Associates, Inc.'s Motion
for Summary Judgment against Images & Attitude, Inc., For Breach of
Contract and in Opposition to Macris & Associates, Inc's and Mike
Macris' Motion for Summary Judgment Against Images & Attitude, Inc.
and Thomas Mower Re: Alter Ego, Fraudulent Inducement, Interference
with Contractual and Economic Relations, Defamation, and Breach of
Contract (R. 1017); and its Memorandum in Support of Defendants'
Motion to Strike and in Opposition to Supplemental Memorandum in
Support of Macris & Associates, Inc.'s and Mike Macris' Motion for
Summary Judgment Re: Fraudulent Inducement (R. 1206).
After oral argument had been held on the matter, Macris
& Associates filed a Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Macris
& Associates, Inc.'s and Mike Macris' Motion for Summary Judgment
Re: Fraudulent Inducement asserting that the claim was barred by
the principles of res judicata

on the basis that the arbitrator in

the matter of Eclat, Inc. f/k/a Images v. Affinity, Inc., Consolidated Arbitration Case Nos. 81-81002693 and 81-181006092, in ruling
on a motion for summary judgment, held

that Images was not

fraudulently induced into a contract with Affinity (R. 1191) . In
its supplemental memorandum, Macris & Associates reasoned that
since the misrepresentations Images relied on in entering into the
Addendum with Macris & Associates were essentially the same as the
APPEAL.BRF (AN/MACRIS)
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misrepresentations which were the basis for Images' fraudulent
misrepresentation claim against Affinity, Images' claim against
Macris & Associates was res judicata

notwithstanding the fact that

the two different suits involved two separate contracts with two
separate entities
1191).

(Affinity and Macris & Associates)

(R. 1180-

The trial court accepted Macris & Associates' reasoning,

and on the 18th of February, 1994, entered an order dismissing
Images' fraudulent inducement claim (R. 1251).
The remaining claims between Macris & Associates, Michael
Macris, and Images came on for trial on February 16, 17, 21, 22,
24, and 27, and March 27, 1995.

At trial, the court refused to

allow Images to call a material witness in its case in chief,
namely William Crismon, who was listed on both Images' and Macris
& Associates' witness lists (R. 4932, 4940).

The court made its

determination based upon the fact that William Crismon was not
listed in Images' responses to interrogatories submitted prior to
the discovery cut-off date even though (i) Macris & Associates was
on notice of the witness and the matters to which he would testify,
(ii) William Crismon was already listed on Macris & Associates'
witness list, and (iii) he was listed on Images' witness list
submitted to the court over a month prior to the trial (R. 492140) .
After the trial, the trial court entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law on the 14th of September, 1995 (R.
3060).

Among the trial court's findings, the court found: Macris

& Associates was active in promoting Images and Images products
APPEAL BRF (AN/MAC RIS)
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from August 1989 through March 1991 (R. 3056); Macris & Associates
fulfilled its responsibilities under the contract with Images (R.
3052); Images wrongfully terminated the Addendum with Macris &
Associates (R. 3051); and Macris' activities in forming a competing
company were not imputed to Macris & Associates (R. 3048).

From

the Findings of Fact, the trial court entered its Conclusions of
Law which included: Macris & Associates performed according to all
conditions of the contract between the parties (R. 3046);
materially breached

Images

the contract between the parties when it

suspended Macris & Associates' autoqualification (R. 3047); Images
materially breached the contract between the parties when it ceased
paying Macris & Associates (R. 3047); Macris & Associates is not
the alter ego of Michael Macris, nor is Michael Macris the alter
ego of Macris & Associates (R. 3046); and Macris & Associates did
not materially breach the contract with Images (R. 3046).
The trial court then entered its Judgment against Images
on the 14th of September, 1995 (R. 3064) . It is from this Judgment
as well as the partial summary judgment order entered on the 18th
of February, 1994 that Images appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS
In 19 89, Michael Macris ("Macris") was the President of
two companies: Affinity Inc. ("Affinity"), a nail system manufacturing company of which Macris was the sole shareholder, director
and employee; and Macris & Associates, Inc. ("Macris & Associates"), a marketing company of which Macris and his wife, Valerie
APPEAL.BRF (AN/MACRIS)
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Macris, were the only directors and shareholders at that time and
Macris was the only employee (R. 4668-69, 4842, 4859, 4861).

In

the spring of 1989, Macris approached Images & Attitude, Inc.
("Images11)- -a multi-level marketing company which markets health
and beauty products--through its President, Thomas Mower ("Mower"),
concerning the possibility of Images marketing a nail care system
manufactured by Affinity.

Macris also represented to Mower that

Macris was interested in participating in Images as a distributor
of Images products. (R. 5154-55).
In the course of negotiating contracts between Affinity
and Images, and between Macris & Associates and Images, and as an
inducement to Images to enter into the contracts, Macris represented to Mower that Macris had obtained a state of the art nail
gel which had been developed by a Dr. Lyman, who was a scientist
with the University of Utah (R. 1047, 5176) . In reliance upon this
false representation and other misrepresentations by Macris, Images
entered into a contract with Affinity in June of 1989 for the
purchase of nail gels and lamp housings to be used in the assembly
by Images of a nail care kit (R. 1046-47).
On or about the 7th of August, 1989, Macris applied for
an Images Distributorship under the name, Macris & Associates (R.
4669) . In the course of negotiating a distributorship for Macris,
Macris indicated he had approximately two million dollars worth of
advertising for the nail kits already in place, and he offered a
proposal to Mower whereby the National Enquirer would run a full
story on the nail care system which included nail gel developed by
APPEAL.BRF (AN/MAC RIS)
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Dr. Lyman and Macris would sign up the prospective distributors.
In exchange, Images would automatically qualify Maoris' distributorship to the level of Presidential--meaning that Images would pay
bonuses

to Macris as if his distributorship had reached the

Presidential level even though it had not (R. 793-96).
Macris also represented that he had several "big-hitters"
in multi-level marketing, including Hayden and Joanne Cameron and
Margie Hunsaker, who would also be willing to sign up as distributors, if they could be "autoqualified" at the Presidential level as
well (R. 5160-63) .

Macris suggested that by autoqualifying the

three distributors at the Executive level, they would be free to
pursue the thousands of leads that would come from the National
Enquirer ad without the distractions of meeting monthly sales
requirements (R. 5162).
In reliance upon the representations of Macris, Images
agreed

to enter

into an Addendum

to Distributor

Application

("Addendum") whereby Macris & Associates would be "autoqualified"
at the Executive level as long as Macris & Associates was "active
in promoting Images and Images products." (R. 794, 5176, Trial
Exhibit 1) . The stated objective of the Addendum was for Macris &
Associates to ultimately "develop each distributorship according to
the width projects of the Images marketing plan."
2) .

(Trial Exhibit

The Images marketing plan required a distributor to have

twelve front-line qualified executive distributors in order to
qualify at the Presidential level (R. 4675). Two identical Addenda

APPEAL.BRF (AN/MACRIS)
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were negotiated by Macris and entered into by Images with the
Camerons and Margie Hunsaker (Trial Exhibits 3 and 4).
At approximately the time Images entered into Addendum
agreements with Macris & Associates, the Camerons, and Hunsaker,
Macris signed the Cameron distributorship directly frontline to
Macris & Associates, and the Hunsaker distributorship was signed up
under the Cameron distributorship (R. 5098, Trial Exhibit 3) . From
the time the Macris & Associates Addendum was executed until Images
terminated Macris & Associates autoqualification status, Macris &
Associates had not signed up a single distributorship frontline to
Macris & Associates other than the MacGregor and Cameron distributorships in August of 1989 (R. 4912, 5212).
In approximately the summer of 199 0, Images distributors
began experiencing irritation as a result of the nail gel (R.
5223) .

During this period, Hayden Cameron discovered that Dr.

Lyman was not in fact the developer of the nail gel sold to Images
by Affinity. At that point, Hayden Cameron refused to run an ad to
market the nail care product through the National Enquirer or any
other national magazines. (R. 5104-06).
In approximately the fall of 199 0 and while Macris was
the President and sole employee of Macris & Associates, Macris
began providing other Images distributors with sample nail gels for
testing purposes, which gels later became the primary product for
a newly organized and competing company
4845).

(R. 4681, 4683, 4774,

Images repeatedly instructed Macris that he should cease

testing gels on Images distributors and that such conduct constiAPPEAL.BRF (AN/MACRIS)
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tuted a breach of Images policies and procedures (R. 5051, Trial
Exhibits 12, 39, 55). Not later than February of 1991 and while
President and sole employee of Macris & Associates, Macris began
his efforts to form a multilevel marketing company to market nail
care systems in direct competition with Images (R. 5611) .

This

company was eventually called Emily Star, Inc. d/b/a Emily Rose (R.
4752, 5110).
On or about the 7th of March, 1991, Images terminated
Macris & Associates' autoqualification status for failure to remain
active in building the Macris & Associates distributorship (Trial
Exhibit 8, R. 4684).
Macris

& Associates

Thereafter, Images terminated the entire
distributorship

for

testing, and for competitive activities.

inactivity,

for gel

Macris & Associates

responded by commencing this action (R. 8).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellant Images asserts that the trial court committed
reversible error in no less than three instances in this litigation.

First, the trial court erred when it granted Macris &

Associates' Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of
judicata.

res

Next, the trial court erroneously found that the acts of

Michael Macris were not attributable to Macris & Associates and
that Macris & Associates was not the alter ego of Michael Macris.
Finally, the trial court erred at trial when it excluded a witness
from testifying in Images' case in chief.

APPEAL.BRF (AN/MAC RIS)
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Regarding

Images' first assignment of error, Images

asserts that the collateral estoppel branch of the doctrine of res
judicata

did not apply to bar Images' fraudulent inducement claim

against Macris & Associates. The issue actually considered in the
prior arbitration proceeding was whether Michael Macris' misrepresentations regarding the role of Dr. Lyman in developing Macris'
nail gel

induced

Images

into

entering

into a contract with

Affinity.

The issues presented in this case were whether Michael

Macris' misrepresentations regarding the role of Dr. Lyman and his
misrepresentations regarding advertising and Macris' ability to
bring in "big-hitters" induced Images into entering into a contract
with Macris & Associates. The issues were not identical. Nor was
Images afforded an opportunity

for competent, full, and fair

litigation of the issues in the earlier arbitration proceedings.1
Accordingly, collateral estoppel did not apply and the trial court
erred in entering summary judgment against Images on that basis.
Images' second assignment of error relates to the trial
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law which erroneously
found and concluded that Michael Macris was not acting as an agent
for Macris & Associates when he engaged in disruptive, competitive
and inappropriate behavior, that the acts of Macris were not
attributable to Macris & Associates, and that Macris & Associates
was not the alter ego of Michael Macris.

The marshaled evidence

including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are insuffi1

Actually, the arbiter improperly made factual determinations on the Motion
for Summary Judgment (R. 1195-98).
APPEAL.BRF (AN/MACRIS)

11

cient to support the trial court's findings. Instead, the evidence
overwhelmingly supports Images' assertions that the acts of Macris
are attributable to Macris & Associates, or alternatively, that
Macris & Associates is the alter ego of Michael Macris. Additionally, to the extent that the trial court's conclusions of law are
based upon its erroneous findings of fact, they too are incorrect.
Had the trial court correctly concluded
improper,

and

competitive

activities

of

that the disruptive,
Michael

Macris

are

attributable to Macris 6c Associates, or alternatively that Macris
& Associates was the alter ego of Michael Macris, it would have
necessarily concluded that Macris & Associates first breached the
agreement with Images by engaging in such disruptive, improper, and
competitive conduct.

Accordingly, Images has been prejudiced by

the trial court's erroneous findings of fact and conclusions of
law.
Concerning Images' final assignment of error, the trial
court abused its discretion when it excluded William Crismon from
testifying at the trial of this matter. William Crismon was added
to Images' final witness list which was submitted to the Court and
to opposing counsel over one month in advance of trial.

Mr.

Crismon was already listed on Macris & Associates' witness list and
had been deposed by Images three and one-half months prior to
trial.

There was no judicially imposed deadline for submitting

witness lists in this case.

On the contrary, the trial court had

earlier entered an order based upon the parties' stipulation
specifically stating that the parties' witness lists could be
APPEAL BRF (AN/MAC RIS)
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supplemented.

The law is Utah is clear.

It is an abuse of

discretion for a trial court to exclude a witness from testifying
at trial when no deadline for designating witnesses was imposed by
the trial court.
The numerous errors of the trial court in this case
mandate that its Judgment be overturned and remanded to the trial
court for a new trial on the issues contained in Images' Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint and Images' affirmative defenses
against Macris & Associates' Complaint.
ARGUMENT
Images asserts that the trial court committed at least
three errors which were substantial, prejudicial, and adversely
effected the outcome of trial; namely, that (i) the trial court
erred in granting Macris & Associates' motion for summary judgment
on the issue of fraudulent inducement; (ii) the trial court erred
in concluding that Macris' competitive and improper acts were not
attributable to Macris & Associates, or alternatively, that Macris
& Associates was not the alter ego of Michael Macris; and (iii) the
trial court erroneously excluded relevant testimony of certain
witnesses at trial.

Based upon these errors, the Judgment should

be reversed as a matter of law, or the case should be remanded for
a new trial on these issues.

APPEAL BRF (AN/MACRIS)
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I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DISMISSING
IMAGES' CLAIM FOR FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT ON THE BASIS OF
RES

JUDICATA.

The trial court entered summary judgment on Defendant's
fraudulent

inducement

judicata.

claim based

upon

the

doctrine

of

res

"Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine issue

of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 293
Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (Utah App. 1996); Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
857 P.2d 263, 265 (Utah App. 1993).

Since summary judgments are

decided as questions of law, this Court should "accord no deference
to the trial court's determinations and review the issues under a
correctness

standard."

Id.

Furthermore, where

this review

involves a summary judgment, this Court should "view the facts and
all

reasonable

inferences

drawn

favorable to the nonmoving party."

therefrom

in the light most

De Baritault v. Salt Lake City

Corp. 913 P.2d 743, 744 (Utah 1996) (quoting Hicrcrins v. Salt Lake
County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993)); Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d
132, 133 (Utah 1992) .
Images' Amended Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint
alleged a cause of action against Macris & Associates and Mike
Macris

("Macris") for fraudulent inducement based upon several

statements made by Macris to Images' President, Thomas Mower
("Mower").

These statements included the following:

(i) that

Macris had developed a nail gel and nail preparation

for a

fingernail bonding system with Dr. Donald Lyman of the University
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of Utah; and (ii) that Macris had advertising already in place to
promote the fingernail bonding system, which advertising was worth
approximately 2.5 million dollars (R. 285, 795) .2
Macris & Associates filed several motions for summary
judgment in August of 1993 including a motion requesting summary
judgment on Images' fraudulent inducement claim (R. 732) .

In

support of its motion, Macris & Associates argued that neither
Macris & Associates nor Mike Macris made the alleged misrepresentations, and even if they have made the misrepresentations, Images
did not reasonably rely upon them in entering into the Addendum
Agreement with Macris & Associates (R. 716-22).

In opposition to

Macris & Associates' motion and as supported by the Affidavit of
Tom Mower (R. 790-97), Images established that genuine issues of
material fact existed relative to whether Mike Macris made the
alleged misrepresentations and whether Images relied upon the
alleged misrepresentations (R. 1001-17; 1043-48).
After oral argument on the matter, Macris & Associates
filed a supplemental memorandum in support of its motion for
summary judgment.

Macris & Associates informed the court of

arbitration proceedings between Images and Affinity (the nail gel
company solely owned and operated by Mike Macris).

(R. 1191).

In the Affinity proceedings, Images had also asserted a
fraudulent inducement claim against Affinity.

2

Affinity informed

Images' Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint contained a
typographical error.
Images claimed that Macris represented $2,000,000 to
$2,500,000 in advertising, not $250,000 as set forth in the Amended Counterclaim
and Third-Party Complaint. See Mower Affidavit at R. 794.
APPEAL BRF (AN/MAC RIS)
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the court that the Arbiter in the Affinity action ruled that
"Affinity made no misrepresentations of material facts to [Images]
to induce [Images] to enter into the Agreement and [Images] , in any
event, did not reasonably rely on the alleged misrepresentations."
(R. 1189) . Macris & Associates then urged the court to "assert the
doctrine of collateral estoppel to prevent Images from relitigating
the issue of fraudulent inducement insofar as that issue is based
on the allegations concerning Dr. Lyman and his role in developing
the gel products sold under the Affinity Agreement."

(R. 1188).

After consideration of Macris & Associates' supplemental
memorandum, the trial court ruled that the issue as to whether Mike
Macris had fraudulently induced Images had been fully and fairly
litigated in the prior arbitration proceeding and that the doctrine
of collateral estoppel barred Images from asserting a fraudulent
inducement claim against Macris & Associates and Mike Macris (R.
1233).

Thereafter, the trial court granted Macris & Associates'

motion for summary judgment relating to Images' claim for fraudulent inducement based upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel (R.
1250-51) .
Collateral estoppel bars a party from relitigating an
issue previously litigated where (1) the issue in the subsequent
action is identical to the issue decided in the previous action;
(2) the issue was decided in a final judgment on the merits; (3)
the issue was competently, fully, and fairly litigated in the first
action; and (4) the party against whom the doctrine was applied was
a party to the first action.
APPEAL.BRF (AN/MACRIS)
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629, 632 (Utah 1995); Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1184 (Utah
1993) rev'd

on other

grounds,

297 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Aug. 13, 1996);

Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 248 (Utah App. 1987).
The trial court's ruling was erroneous in many respects.
First, the Affinity arbitration dealt with whether Images had been
fraudulently induced into entering into the Affinity contract, not
the Macris & Associates Addendum and Distributorship Agreement.
Second, the issue of whether Images had been fraudulently induced
into entering into the Macris & Associates Addendum was never
addressed in the Affinity arbitration.

Third, since the Affinity

arbitration matter was decided on a motion for summary judgment, no
full and fair litigation occurred of Images' fraudulent inducement
claim. Finally, the issue of whether Macris misrepresented that he
had advertising and "big-hitters" already in place was never
addressed in the Affinity arbitration and likewise was apparently
not considered by the trial court in granting Macris & Associates'
motion for summary judgment.
A.
Collateral Estoppel Does Not Bar Images From Claiming
Fraudulent Inducement Regarding the Macris & Associates Addendum.
The first element of collateral estoppel requires that
the issues in the subsequent action be identical to the issues in
the former action.

Timm, 851 P.2d at 1184.

In the Affinity

arbitration, Images specifically alleged that Mike Macris made
material misrepresentations regarding the role of one Dr. Lyman, a
scientist then employed at the University of Utah, in developing
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the nail gel supplied by Mike Macris and to be used in the nail
care kit. Images further alleged that Macris' representations were
false, were intended to induce Images into entering into a contract
with Affinity, and that Images did rely upon Macris' representations.

(R. 1190) .
The fact that Images has relied in part upon the same

misrepresentation concerning Dr. Lyman for a separate contract does
not create identical issues. In the Arbitration action, the issue
was whether Images was fraudulently induced by virtue of the
misrepresentation into entering into the Affinity contract in June
of 1989 (R. 4669).

In the instant case, however, the issue to be

litigated was whether Images was fraudulently induced into entering
the Macris & Associates Addendum and Distributorship Agreement in
approximately August of 19 89 (R. 4669).
Unfortunately, the Arbiter's ruling in the Arbitration is
not sufficiently detailed to assist in the determination of whether
identical issues were involved.

The Arbiter specifically ruled:

Affinity made no misrepresentations of material facts to
[Images] to induce [Images] to enter into the [Affinity]
Agreement and [Images] , in any event, did not reasonably
rely on the alleged misrepresentations.
(R. 1197) .

In fashioning this ruling, the Arbiter failed to

specify whether it was his finding that either (i) Macris made no
representations; (ii) the representations of Macris were not false;
(iii) the representations of Macris were not material; (iv) or
precisely which alleged representations
decision upon.

APPEAL.BRF (AN/MACRIS)
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the Arbiter based his

Clearly Macris & Associates presented no evidence to the
trial

court

arbitration

to demonstrate
were

identical

that
to

the issues

the

issues

involved

presented

in the
in

this

litigation. Accordingly, the trial court erred in determining that
the first element of the doctrine of collateral estoppel had been
met.
Similarly, there was no evidence presented to the trial
court to suggest that the issue of whether Images relied upon the
representations concerning Dr. Lyman's role in entering into the
Macris & Associates Addendum agreement was even considered in the
arbitration proceedings.

Macris & Associates was not a party to

the arbitration proceedings; nor was the Macris & Associates
Addendum or Distributorship Agreement at issue in the arbitration
proceedings.

(R. 1195-98).

Clearly, the trial court erred in

determining that the issues contained in the arbitration proceedings and in the instant litigation were identical.
B.
Summary Judgment in a Prior Arbitration Proceeding Does
Not Constitute Full and Fair Litigation.
Images asserts that since Images' fraudulent inducement
claims were decided on Affinity's motion for summary judgment in
the Arbitration proceedings, Images was not afforded a competent,
full and fair litigation of Images' claims. Accordingly, the third
element of the doctrine of collateral estoppel was not satisfied.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that where a case
is decided on a motion for summary judgment, it is possible that no
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full and adequate evidentiary hearing was held. Rocky Mtn. Thrift
Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989) . In
Rocky, the Utah Supreme Court stated, "Inasmuch as this case was
decided in the trial court on a motion for summary judgment, no
full and adequate evidentiary hearing was held to resolve critical
facts."

Id. at 464.
Likewise, Images was not afforded a full and adequate

evidentiary hearing on its fraudulent inducement claims. Moreover,
in the Affinity arbitration, the Arbiter overstepped his bounds by
deciding very factually intensive and material issues at the
summary judgment stage. Images should not be barred from litigating in the present action the question of whether Mike Macris or
Macris & Associates fraudulently induced Images into entering into
the Addendum and Distributorship Agreement where

the earlier

arbitration proceedings determined genuine issues of material fact
at the summary judgment stage relative to a separate agreement with
a separate entity.

Images was not afforded competent, full and

fair litigation of the issue of whether Macris' representations
regarding Dr. Lyman fraudulently induced Images into entering into
the Addendum and Distributorship Agreement with Macris & Associates. Accordingly, the third element of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel was not met and the trial court erred in applying the
doctrine to Images' peril.
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C.
The Former Arbitration Proceeding Did Not Address Macris'
Representation Regarding Advertising.
As mentioned, Images' Amended Counterclaim and Third
Party Complaint alleged that Mike Macris represented--at the time
he negotiated the Addendum and Distributorship Agreement--that he
and Macris & Associates already had advertising in place worth
approximately two million dollars to promote the nail care product
(R. 285).

This alleged fraudulent misrepresentation was not

addressed in the arbitration proceedings, nor was it even referenced in Macris & Associates' Supplemental Memorandum in Support of
Macris & Associates, Inc.'s and Mike Macris' Motion for Summary
Judgment Re: Fraudulent Inducement

(R. 1191) or in Macris &

Associates' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' [Images] Motion
to Strike Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment Re: Fraudulent Inducement (R. 1225) .
Moreover, nothing in the arbitration order suggests that
the alleged
considered

misrepresentation

regarding

during arbitration.

Clearly,

collateral estoppel were not met.
materially

misrepresented

his

advertising

was

even

the requirements of

The issue of whether Macris

advertising

capability

and his

ability to bring in "big-hitters" was never arbitrated. Therefore,
the issues

litigated

in the arbitration proceeding

were not

identical to those raised by Images in this action, neither was
there a competent, full and fair litigation of the advertising
issue in the arbitration proceeding.

Timm, 851 P. 2d at 1184.

Accordingly, the trial court clearly erred in granting Macris &
APPEAL BRF (AN/MAC RIS)
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Associates' motion for summary judgment on Images' fraudulent
inducement claim on the basis of collateral estoppel.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS THAT THE COMPETITIVE ACTIVITIES OF MICHAEL MACRIS WERE NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO MACRIS &
ASSOCIATES CONSTITUTE CLEAR ERROR.
The evidence presented at trial did not support the trial

court's findings and conclusions that the competitive activities of
Michael Macris were not attributable to Macris & Associates either
because Michael Macris was the agent of Macris & Associates and
acted within the scope of his employment or because Macris &
Associates was not the alter ego of Michael Macris.

Indeed, the

evidence marshalled on appeal does not support the trial court's
findings and conclusions.

Instead, the evidence overwhelmingly

supports Images' position that (i) Michael Macris was an agent of
Macris & Associates when he engaged in competitive and disruptive
activities; (ii) Macris & Associates is the alter ego of Michael
Macris; and (iii) Macris' competitive and disruptive conduct is
attributable to Macris & Associates.
A.
Images Specifically
Court's Findings of Fact.

Challenges

Twelve

of

the Trial

Images challenges the trial court's findings of fact
which found that Michael Macris' competitive activities were not
performed as an agent or representative of Macris & Associates.
Specifically, Images challenges the following twelve findings:
21. In the attempt to develop or locate a suitable nail
gel, Macris, on behalf of Affinity, Inc. ("Affinity")--a
APPEAL BRF (AN/MAC RIS)
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company in which Macris was involved but which was s e p a r a t e
and d i s t i n c t from P l a i n t i f f [Macris & Associates] and had i t s
own c o n t r a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p with Defendant [Images] as a
s u p p l i e r - - h a d individuals sample various gels to determine
whether they could use the gels without i r r i t a t i o n and to
determine whether
other c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the gels were
appropriate.3
22. Affinity, Inc. provided gel samples to Hunsaker, who
had t r i e d various gel samples for Affinity even before
becoming a d i s t r i b u t o r for Defendant. Affinity a l s o provided
various gel samples to Ms. Reynolds, who had become s e n s i t i z e d
to Defendant's g e l . Affinity also provided gel samples to
Defendant to allow Defendant's
personnel and various d i s t r i b u t o r s to t r y the samples. 4
23. In a l e t t e r dated August 31, 1990, addressed to
"Mike Macris A f f i n i t y , " Mower, on behalf of Defendant noted
t h a t Affinity had provided new gels to d i s t r i b u t o r s to t e s t
before Defendant had seen the new g e l s . Mower explained t h a t
he had not seen A f f i n i t y ' s new gel but had heard about i t from
d i s t r i b u t o r s . Mower requested t h a t Affinity not supply any
gels to Defendant's d i s t5r i b u t o r s to sample unless Defendant
was a l s o given the g e l s .
24. Following the August 31, 1990 l e t t e r , Macris, on
behalf of Affinity, always provided defendant with any new gel
before any d i s t r i b u t o r sampled the g e l .
25. Defendant also began t e s t i n g i t s own new gels on i t s
d i s t r i b u t o r s , including on Hunsaker and Ms. Reynolds--the two
d i s t r i b u t o r s who t r i e d A f f i n i t y ' s new g e l s . Hunsaker reported
to Mower her impressions of any new gel she t r i e d for Affinit y . Mower never i n s t r u c t e d her not to t e s t or sample Affinity's gels.
26. P l a i n t i f f never t e s t e d or otherwise provided gels to
any of Defendant's d i s t r i b u t o r s .
3

Images does not d i s p u t e t h a t Macris provided g e l s t o Images' d i s t r i b u t o r s
or t h a t he d i d so on b e h a l f of A f f i n i t y . Rather, Images a s s e r t s t h a t h i s a c t i o n s
a r e a l s o a t t r i b u t a b l e t o Macris & A s s o c i a t e s , of which he was t h e s o l e
s h a r e h o l d e r and employee.
4

Images does not d i s p u t e t h a t Macris s u p p l i e d g e l s t o Reynolds and
Hunsaker, b u t r a t h e r t h a t Macris was an agent for b o t h A f f i n i t y and Macris &
A s s o c i a t e s when he s u p p l i e d g e l s to Reynolds and Hunsaker.
5
Images contends t h a t the l e t t e r was addressed t o Macris a t A f f i n i t y and
t h a t Mower r e q u e s t e d t h a t Macris, not merely A f f i n i t y , not supply g e l s t o Images
distributors.
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40. Defendant warned Plaintiff in March 1991, after
already terminating Plaintiff's autoqualification status, not
to supply gels to Defendant's distributors, or it may be
grounds for terminating Plaintiff. Plaintiff never tested or
otherwise provided gels to Defendant's distributors.
41.
In a letter dated March 29, 1991, after already
terminating Plaintiff's autoqualification status and failing
to pay Plaintiff for the month of February 1991, Defendant
gave Plaintiff "formal" notice that it was considering
termination of its distributorship. The reasons given were
testing gels after warnings not to do so, lack of activity
under the Addendum, and damaging activity against Defendant
and its distributor force. The evidence did not support the
stated reasons for termination, all of which were without
merit. Plaintiff had not engaged in conduct which violated
Plaintiff's [sic] policies and procedures or the contract.

51. There was not adequate or credible evidence to
establish that Plaintiff breached its contract with Defendant.
52. Macris' activities on behalf of the new company
Emily Rose were not done either as an agent or representative
for the Plaintiff.
Plaintiff never had any contractual
relationship with Emily Rose.6

57. There was not adequate or credible evidence to
establish that Macris & Associates, Inc. is the alter ego of
Michael Macris, or that Michael Macris is the alter ego of
Macris & Associates, Inc.
There was ample evidence that
adequate corporate formalities were met and that each maintained their separate legal personalities.
58. There was not adequate or credible evidence to
establish that observance of the corporate distinction between
plaintiff and Macris sanctioned a fraud, promoted an injustice
or resulted in an inequity.
(R. 3047-60)

6
Images agrees that Macris conducted activities on behalf of Emily Rose,
but disputes the trial court's finding that he was not an agent or representative
of Macris & Associates when he conducted those activities.
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There is no factual dispute

(i) that Michael Macris

supplied gels to Images distributors for sampling and testing (R.
4681, 4773, 4845-46); (ii) that Images sent Macris a letter dated
August 31, 1990 requesting Macris to stop supplying gels to Images
distributors for sampling (Trial Exhibit 55) ; or (iii) that Macris
created a new company, Emily Rose (R. 5611; Trial Exhibits 93, 94) .
Images contends that all of these competitive actions were done by
Michael Macris himself, and that since he was the sole shareholder
and employee of Macris & Associates, these actions were attributable to Macris & Associates thereby constituting a breach of its
agreement with Images.
B.
The Evidence Marshalled On Appeal Is Insufficient to
Support the Trial Court's Findings.
Images recognizes its burden on appeal.

"To show clear

error, the appellant must marshal all of the evidence in support of
the trial court's finding and then demonstrate that the evidence,
including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient

to support

the findings

against an attack."

State v.

Higcrinbotham, 917 P.2d 545 (Utah 1996); State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d
474, 475-76 (Utah 1990); Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d
467, 470 (Utah 1989).

While at first appearance, such marshaling

seems an arduous task, a review of the trial record indicates that
the evidence supporting the trial court's findings of fact consists
mainly of the self-serving testimony of Michael Macris.
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Michael Macris testified that he personally supplied gels
to Images distributors for testing purposes, however, Macris &
Associates did not test gels on anyone (R. 4681, 4845) .

Macris

also testified that Affinity gave nail gels to Images distributors
(R. 4682, 4851).

Macris further testified that American Polymer

also gave gels to distributors (R. 4683, 4856).

American Polymer

was another gel manufacturing company controlled and operated by
Michael Macris (R. 4853-55).

Significantly, American Polymer had

no contract to supply gels to Images.

Thus, Macris, the sole

employee of Macris & Associates, was supplying the nail gel of a
competing company, American Polymer, to Images distributors and
later to Emily Rose.
With respect to the other competitive actions of Macris,
namely, forming a competing multi-level marketing company, again
the only testimony supporting the trial court's findings consist of
the self-serving testimony of Michael Macris. Macris claimed that
(i) Macris & Associates never presented other opportunities to any
Images distributors (R. 4685); (ii) Macris was actually attempting
to recruit an individual by the name of David Floor into Images in
February 1991, not into Macris' new competing company (R. 4823);
(iii) Macris did not resign from Macris & Associates on March 12,
1991 in order to create his competing company, Emily Rose (R.
5503); and (iv) Macris did not begin to organize Emily Rose until
the middle to end of March, 1991 (R. 5547-48).
All of this evidence, taken together, is insufficient to
support the trial court's findings. Moosman, 794 P.2d at 475-76.
APPEAL BRF (AN/MAC RIS)
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Maoris'

self-serving

testimony

fails

to demonstrate

that his

disruptive gel testing and competitive activities in creating Emily
Rose were not also committed while Macris was acting as an agent
for Macris & Associates.
The record is replete with evidence to support a finding
that even though Macris may have been acting on behalf of Affinity,
American Polymer or Emily Rose when engaging in disruptive and
competitive activities, he was also the sole agent and representative of Macris & Associates.

The distributors only dealt with

Michael Macris. (R. 4732, 4734, 4749, 4774, 5591, 5614).

Macris

did not distinguish on whose behalf or in which capacity he was
acting when he engaged in the disruptive or competitive activities.
For instance, the record shows that Glen Tillotson never
understood the difference between Macris and Macris & Associates.
Tillotson dealt with Michael Macris and then later found out it was
Macris & Associates.7

(R. 4732, 4734).

Tillotson also believed

that Affinity was a company that Macris was affiliated with (R.
4733) .
Margie Aliprandi8 also testified concerning her knowledge
of

the

relationship

companies.

between Michael

Macris

and

his

various

Aliprandi testified that she understood that Michael

Macris supplied the nail gels to Images (R. 4749) . At some point,

7

Mr. Tillotson's testimony is significant because he was a witness for
Macris & Associates and he worked closely with Michael Macris in developing the
Hunsaker downline from the beginning.
8
Margie Aliprandi was formerly known as Margie Hunsaker.
The names
Aliprandi and Hunsaker have been used interchangeably throughout the record.
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Maoris explained that the gels were supplied through his company,
but initially she did not understand that to be the case.
Aliprandi, Macris was doing it all.

To

Aliprandi even told other

Images distributors that Michael Macris supplied the nail gel. (R.
4749) .

Furthermore, when Macris gave nail gels to Aliprandi to

sample, Aliprandi understood that they were coming from Macris.
She did not know on behalf of which entity Macris was acting (R.
4774) .
Similarly, Kathrine Duffy, an Images distributor to whom
Macris had supplied gels for testing purposes, knew that Macris was
in Margie Aliprandi's upline, but had never heard of Macris &
Associates (R. 5591) .

Jim Tate met Macris several months after

becoming an Images distributor. Tate was also an Images distributor to whom Macris supplied nail gels for testing purposes.

Tate

had learned in early 1991 that Michael Macris was no longer
supplying gels to Images (significantly, Tate referred to Macris
and not to Affinity).

Tate had never heard of Macris & Associates

(R. 5594) .
Likewise, Randall Johnston, who met Michael Macris in the
summer of 1989, understood that Michael Macris was Margie Aliprandi's sponsor, believed that Macris was in Johnston's upline in
Images, and had never heard of Macris & Associates

(R. 5596) .

Finally, Janiell Reynolds--yet another Images distributor to whom
Macris supplied gels for testing purposes--testified that she knew
Michael Macris was in her Images upline.

Although Reynolds had a

lot of dealings with Macris, she did not really know what Macris &
APPEAL BRP (AN/MAC RIS)
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Associates was and had felt that Affinity was a predecessor to
Images. (R. 5614-15, 5618).
With regard to Macris' other competitive activities,
individuals contacted by Macris knew that Macris was an Images
distributor, not that he was merely an employee of the corporate
distributor Macris & Associates and that he was not acting as an
agent for Macris & Associates when he attempted to negotiate
contracts for competing business.

Susan Franceschi met Macris in

December of 1990 when Macris was attempting to negotiate a contract
for American Polymer to supply nail gel to Lume, the company by
which Franceschi was employed.

Macris represented that he, not

Macris & Associates, was an Images distributor and intimated that
women in his downline who liked the nail gel Macris proposed to
supply to Lume might become Lume distributors instead. (R. 562527) .
With respect to Macris' new company, Emily Rose, David
Floor, an initial investor in Emily Rose, testified that Macris
approached him in January or February of 1991 to raise money for
Macris' new company.9

Floor knew Macris because Macris had

approached him one year earlier about the prospect of becoming an
Images distributor.

(R. 5611).

While Macris was engaging in disruptive and competitive
activities, he was the sole shareholder, officer, director, agent

q
0f course, Macris claims he did not contact Floor until the middle to end
of March, 1991. However, the proformas prepared by Macris for Emily Rose appear
to be dated March 1, 1991 which is more consistent with the unbiased testimony
of Floor. (Trial Exhibits 93, 94).
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and employee of Affinity, a company manufacturing nail gel for use
in a home nail care kit (R. 4669, 4842-43).
another

nail

gel manufacturing

Macris also created

company, American

approximately November of 1990 (R. 4683, 4853).

Polymer

in

Macris was a

director, officer, shareholder and employee of American Polymer.
Macris also began creating Emily Rose in January or February of
1991 (R. 5611) to market the nail gel manufactured by his company,
American Polymer.

During these activities, Macris was also an

officer, director, and the sole shareholder and employee of Macris
& Associates (R. 4861, 5052).
Macris' responsibilities for all these companies was to
market nail gel and related products.

On behalf of all of these

companies, Macris contacted individuals, including Images distributors, who did not recognize Macris' different principles. Even so,
Macris' position at trial was that he was acting on behalf of
American Polymer and Emily Rose, not Macris & Associates, when he
was attempting to negotiate contracts for the competing business.
However, Macris' position ignores the consequences of his acts as
a dual or multiple agent.

Even if Macris was acting on behalf of

American Polymer and Emily Rose, he was still doing it while he was
the sole employee, agent and shareholder of Macris & Associates.
Clearly, the evidence presented before the trial court
and marshaled here, including all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom,

does

conclusions.

not

support

the

trial

court's

findings

and

Instead, the evidence overwhelmingly supports the

finding that Macris was the agent of Macris & Associates and that
APPEAL.BRF (AN/MACR1S)
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Maoris & Associates was the alter ego of Michael Macris as well as
the conclusion that the competitive and disruptive activities of
Michael Macris are attributable to Macris & Associates.
C.
The Trial Court's Conclusions of Law, To the Extent Based
Upon A Tacit Finding That Macris Was Not An Agent for Macris &
Associates, Are Incorrect.
The trial court's erroneous findings led the trial court
to erroneously conclude that the acts of Michael Macris, as an
agent of Macris & Associates, were not attributable to Macris &
Associates. Images specifically disputes the following conclusions
of law:
7.
Plaintiff performed according to all of the conditions of its contract with Defendant until Defendant wrongfully breached the contract, and Plaintiff did not materially
breach the contract. Therefore, Defendant's Second Cause of
Action, based on breach of contract, is without merit or legal
basis and shall be dismissed with prejudice.
(R. 3046) .
Implicit in this Conclusion is a finding that at a
minimum, Macris was not an agent of Macris & Associates when he
engaged

in

the

disruptive

and

competitive

activities

which

constitute a breach of the Distributorship Agreement and the Images
Policies and Procedures (Trial Exhibits 1, 78) . In its conclusion,
the trial court appeared to ignore fundamental principles of agency
law.
"It is well established in the law that a principal is
liable for the acts of his agent within the scope of the agent's
authority, irrespective of whether the principal is disclosed or
APPLAL BRF (AN/MAC RIS)

31

undisclosed.11
1992).

Garland v. Fleischmann, 831 P.2d 107, 110 (Utah

Moreover " [t]he fact that an agent acts in his own name

without disclosing his principal does not preclude liability."
Id. ; 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency

§ 320 (1986) .

A central focus in any

agency question is whether the employee was acting in the scope of
his employment with the principle at the time of the alleged wrong.
Moreover, "[t]he question of whether an employee is acting within
the scope of his employment at a particular time is normally a
question for the fact finder unless there is only one reasonable
conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence."

Lane V. Messer,

731 P.2d 488, 490 (Utah 1986).
In order for the actions of Macris to be considered
within the scope of his employment with Macris & Associates,
Macris' conduct must "(1) 'be of the general kind the employee is
employed to perform'; (2) 'occur within the hours of the employee's
work and the ordinary spatial boundaries of the employment'; and
(3) 'be motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving the
employer's interest.'"

Jackson v. Righter, 891 P.2d 1387, 1391

(Utah 1995) (quoting Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053,
1056 (Utah 1989)).
The evidence presented at trial unquestionably set forth
that Macris was the employee of Macris & Associates and was acting
within the scope of his employment with Macris & Associates when he
engaged in disruptive and competitive activities. Macris & Associates had a contract with Images to market Images and Images'
products (Trial Exhibits 1, 2) .
APPEAL.BRF (AN/MACRIS)
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Macris' duties with respect to

marketing Images and Images' products--specifically Images' nail
gel and care product which was the only product Macris ever
marketed on behalf of Images--included working directly with other
Images distributors, attending distributor meetings, and meeting
with the public for the purpose of promoting Images to members of
the public (R. 4685-91).
At the same time Macris was supposedly promoting Images'
nail care product, including the nail gel, on behalf of Macris &
Associates, he was testing nail gels on Images distributors for the
benefit of his companies Affinity and American Polymer and was also
creating a new marketing company, Emily Rose, to market American
Polymer's gel.

All of this evidence points to one inescapable

conclusion: Macris was directing the activities of four companies
owned and controlled by Macris, without distinguishing which
activities were attributable to which company.

Thus, when Macris

dealt with Images distributors and marketed a nail care product, he
was acting in the scope of his employment with Macris & Associates.
Likewise, when Macris engaged in the disruptive and competitive
activities on behalf of his other companies for the purpose of
marketing a nail care product, he was also acting in the scope of
his employment with Macris & Associates.

As a matter of law,

Macris was acting as the agent of Macris & Associates when he
engaged in the activity which Images alleged constituted a breach
of the Addendum Agreement.

Consequently, Macris' competitive

activities are imputed to Macris & Associates.
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The irony of the trial court's findings and conclusions
underscores the trial court's errors. On one hand, the trial court
determined that the conduct of and the statements made by Michael
Macris, on behalf of Affinity, were also attributable to Macris &
Associates for purposes of collateral estoppel.

(See Section I).

However, for purposes of Images' affirmative defenses, Counterclaim
and Third Party Complaint, the conduct of and the statements made
by Michael Macris were attributable only to the entity he ascribed
them to during his self-serving testimony.

No other witness was

able to segregate his conduct; so, how could the trial court?

The

current result is fundamentally unjust and inequitable and dictates
that this Court overturn the trial court's judgment with respect to
Images' affirmative defenses to Macris & Associates' Complaint and
Images' Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint.
D.
The Trial Court's Conclusion That Macris & Associates Is
Not The Alter Ego of Macris Is Erroneous.
Images also asserts that the evidence presented at trial
overwhelmingly supports a conclusion that Macris & Associate was in
fact the alter ego of Michael Macris, its controlling shareholder,
and constituted a facade used to promote fraud and injustice by
Macris.
Macris' position at trial--apparently adopted by the
trial court--ignored the principle of alter ego.

Clearly, the

evidence presented at trial overwhelmingly supports a conclusion
that Macris & Associates has no separate identity or existence
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apart

from

Michael

Maoris.

Notwithstanding

the

compelling

evidence, the trial court concluded:
6.
Plaintiff [Macris & Associates] is not the alter ego
of Third-Party Defendant [Macris] the alter ego of Plaintiff.
Each maintained their separate legal personalities and the
observance of the corporate distinction between Plaintiff and
Third-Party Defendant would not sanction a fraud, promote an
injustice or result in an inequity.
Therefore Defendant's
First Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party
Defendant, based on alter ego, is without merit or legal basis
and shall be dismissed with prejudice.
(R. 3046) .
Utah courts will pierce the corporate veil of a corporation and hold a shareholder personally liable if
two circumstances [are] present: ' (1) Such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the
corporation and the individual no longer exist, but the
corporation is, instead, the alter ego of one or a few
individuals; and (2) if observed, the corporate form would
sanction a fraud, promote injustice or result in an inequity . '"
Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, 872 P.2d 487, 499 (Utah App. 1994)
(citing Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d

782, 786

(Utah App. 1987).

While not an exhaustive list, factors Utah courts consider in
determining whether to pierce the corporate veil include:
(1) undercapitalization of a one man corporation; (2) failure
to observe corporate formalities; (3) nonpayment of dividends;
(4) siphoning of corporate funds by the dominant shareholders;
(5) nonfunctioning of the other officers or directors; (6)
absence of corporate records; (7) the use of the corporation
as a facade for operations of the dominant stockholder or
stockholders; and (8) the use of the corporate entity in
promoting injustice or fraud.
Colman, 743 P.2d at 786.
At trial, the evidence overwhelmingly preponderated the
fact that Macris used his corporate entities as a facade for the
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operations of Macris

to promote injustice and fraud.

Other

evidence presented at trial also supported Images' alter ego claim.
Such evidence included the fact that Michael Macris was
never certain about which office he held at Macris & Associates at
a particular time. Macris often represented himself as President
of Macris & Associates when he was actually the Secretary, and
versa

vice

(R. 5531, 5540) . Macris represented on 1989 tax returns that

he was the sole shareholder in Macris & Associates even though his
wife, Valerie Macris, testified that his shares had been transferred to her in 1987 (R. 5534-36) . Macris & Associates funds were
used to pay for Affinity's legal fees (R. 5539).

Macris and his

wife were the only employees of Macris & Associates (R. 5040) .
Additionally, Valerie Macris acknowledged that corporate formalities were not always met at Macris & Associates (R. 5125) .
Essentially the only evidence presented by Macris to
counter Images' alter ego claim was Macris' testimony and that of
his wife, Valerie Macris, that Macris & Associates was incorporated
in November of 1985 (Trial Exhibit 72),

Macris & Associates held

board of directors' meetings and Macris & Associates appointed
officers (R. 4864-69) .
The evidence presented at trial overwhelmingly established

that

(i) Macris

& Associates

failed

to observe many

corporate formalities; (ii) Valerie Macris' role within Macris &
Associates was minimal

at best--for

the most part Macris

&

Associates was controlled by Michael Macris; (iii) many corporate
records

for Macris

APPEAL.BRF (AN/MACRIS)
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(iv) Macris &

Associates was used as facade for the operation of its dominant
stockholder, Michael Macris; and

(v) the use of the corporate

entity promoted injustice or fraud by allowing Macris to reap the
rewards of the marketing efforts of distributors in Macris &
Associates' downline while shielding Macris from the consequences
of his disruptive and competitive activities while an agent for
Macris & Associates. Surely, Macris & Associates was the alter ego
of Michael Macris.
The trial court erred in finding that Macris & Associates
was not the alter ego of Michael Macris, that the actions of Macris
are not attributable to Macris & Associates, and that Macris &
Associates did not breach the contract by engaging in disruptive
and competitive activities.

Accordingly, the conclusions of law

based upon these erroneous findings are incorrect.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN REFUSING TO
ALLOW IMAGES TO CALL WILLIAM CRISMON, A WITNESS LISTED ON
BOTH PLAINTIFF'S AND DEFENDANT'S WITNESS LIST.
Over one month in advance of the trial of this matter,
Images filed Defendant Images' Supplemental Response to Plaintiff's
Third

Set

of

Interrogatories

to Defendant10

(herein "Images'

Supplemental Response") wherein Images essentially supplemented its
witness list to include among other individuals, one William
Crismon

(R. 2337-40).

Macris & Associates thereafter filed a

10

Defendant Images's Supplemental Response to Plaintiff's Third Set of
Interrogatories to Defendant was filed in the Fourth District Court on January
13, 1995.
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Motion to Exclude Witnesses seeking to exclude as witnesses for
Images all of the newly added individuals including William Crismon
(R. 2609-11).

Macris & Associates argued essentially that since

Images did not disclose the additional witnesses prior to the
discovery cutoff date of December 1, 1994, Images should be
precluded from calling those additional individuals as witnesses at
trial (R. 2676-82) .
In opposition to Macris & Associates' Motion to Exclude
Witnesses, Images asserted that (i) William Crismon was already
listed on Macris & Associates' witness list; (ii) there was a
stipulation and order in place allowing the parties to supplement
their witness list; (iii) there was no court imposed deadline for
designating witnesses; and (iv) Images' witness list was submitted
over one month in advance of trial (R. 2716-25).

The trial court

heard oral arguments on the motion on the third day of trial and
ruled that the additional witnesses would be excluded with the
exception of David Floor.11 (R. 4940) .
A.
The Trial Court Abused
William Crismon From Testifying.

Its Discretion By Excluding

"Excluding a witness from testifying is . . . 'extreme in
nature and . . . should be employed only with caution and restraint.'11

Barrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R., 830 P.2d 291, 293

n
The trial court made the exception for Mr. Floor since Mr. Floor's
deposition was taken on the December 1, 1994 discovery cutoff date, which
deposition clearly disclosed Macris' involvement with William Crismon regarding
the competitive activities. (R. 4938).

APPEAL.BRF (AN/MACRIS)

38

(Utah App. 1992) (citations omitted) . The trial court abused its
discretion by excluding William Crismon from testifying in Images'
case in chief.

In Barrett, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the

trial court's exclusion of a witness who had been designated only
four days before trial, holding that "absent an order creating a
judicially imposed deadline, a trial court may not sanction a party
by excluding its witnesses under rule 37(b) (2) . " 830 P. 2d 291, 296
(Utah App. 1992).
In the instant case, there was no judicially imposed
deadline for designating witnesses.

In fact, the trial court had

issued an Order allowing the subsequent supplementation of either
parties' witness list (R. 1462).

Where there was no judicially

imposed deadline for designating witnesses, it constituted an abuse
of discretion for the trial court to excluded a witness who had
been designated over a month in advance of trial and who was listed
on the opposing parties' witness list.
B.
Macris & Associates Would Not Have Been Prejudiced Had
William Crismon Been Allowed To Testify.
Clearly, Macris & Associates would not have suffered
prejudice had William Crismon been allowed to testify.
stipulated

at

trial

that William Crismon would

Images

testify only

concerning matters which were discussed at Crismon's deposition
taken on October 20, 1994 and at which counsel for Macris &
Associates were in attendance.
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Moreover, William

Crismon was listed on Macris & Associates' own witness list. (R.
4932).
Images, rather, was prejudiced by
William Crismon in its case in chief.

the exclusion of

The Utah Court of Appeals

addressed the matter of prejudice to the parties in Barrett,
stating:
Some indication of the importance of the error with which
we are here concerned is to be found in the fact that counsel
thought the matter of sufficient consequence that he objected
to [the admission of the evidence] . If it is so plain that it
would not have helped plaintiff's case, one is led to wonder
why counsel made the objection and insisted that it not be
used. The obvious answer seems to be that defendant's counsel
was actually apprehensive that it may have a substantial
effect against his client. Of course, he could not be sure,
nor can we.
830 P.2d at 297.

Likewise, Macris & Associates obviously was

apprehensive about that the testimony of William Crismon--as set
forth in his deposition--might have a substantial effect against
Macris & Associates.
significantly

The deposition testimony of William Crismon

supported

Images' breach

of

contract

claim as

contained in Images' Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint.

It was prejudicial to Images to exclude William Crismon.

Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in excluding
William Crismon's testimony at trial.
CONCLUSION
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

Appellant

respectfully

requests that this Court reverse the Order and Judgment entered by
the Third District Court and remand the case to the Third District
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Court for a new trial on the issues of fraudulent inducement,
breach of contract and alter ego as asserted in Images' affirmative
defenses contained in Images' Amended Counterclaim.
DATED this zcr

dajy—oiL September, 1

j&n***3

S K. POOLE
ANDREA NUFFER
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT in Appeal No. 960218-CA were
mailed, U.S. Mail, postage pre-paid to the following:
STEPHEN T. HARD
(1359)
ROGER D. SANDACK
(2856)
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, BENDINGER & PETERSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellee
First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
this

• f-

day of September,
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ADDENDUM

ffi^'i-^ct

Court o.

l Way
.

CARMA 3. SA-JTH, Cark

frVKs

Deputv

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC.,
Plaintiff,

RULING

vs.

CASE NO. 910400358

IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., a Utah
corporation, and THOMAS MOWER, an
individual,

(Judge Guy R. Burningham)

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501 on Defendants' Motion to
Strike Macris & Associates, Lie's and Mike Macris's Supplemental Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment Re Fraudulent Inducement, and on Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment Re Defendants' Claim of Fraudulent Inducement. The Court has
reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of counsel, oral argument having been heard,
and upon being advised in the premises, now makes the following:
RULING
1. The Court finds that Defendants' Motion to Strike Macris & Associates, Inc.'s
and Mike Macris's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
Re Fraudulent Inducement ("Motion to Strike") would result in keeping relevant information
from this Court that is dispositive of issues before this Court.
2. The Court therefore denies Defendants' Motion to Strike.

A-l

1 OO/f

3. The Court further finds that the prior judgment against the Defendants on the issue
of whether Mr. Macris, whether acting as an agent for Macris & Associates, Inc. or
Affinity, Inc., fraudulently induced Images & Attitude, Inc. need not be re-litigated in this
action. This is based upon the following:
a) Collateral estoppel applies to issues decided on summary judgment;
b) Collateral estoppel applies to issues decided in arbitration proceedings;
c) The issue as to whether Mr. Macris fraudulently induced the Defendants has
already been fully and fairly litigated in a prior arbitration proceeding; and
d) The prior arbitration proceeding found that no fraudulent inducement had
occurred.
4. The Court therefore grants Plaintiff Macris & Associates, Inc.'s and Third-Party
Defendant Mike Macris* Motion for Summary Judgment Re Defendants* Claim of Fraudulent
Inducement.
Counsel for Plaintiff is to prepare an order consistent with the terms of this ruling and
submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for
signature.

Ruling Page -2-

Dated this _/_ day of February, 1994.
BY THE COURT:

cc:

Jon V. Harper, Esq.
Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq.
Dennis K. Poole, Esq.

Ruling Page -3A-3
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DENNIS K. POOLE
(2625)
ANDREA NUFFER
(6623)
DENNIS K. POOLE AND ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Defendants
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
(801) 263-3344
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC.,
STIPULATION
Plaintiff,
vs
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., a Utah
corporation; and THOMAS MOWER, an
individual,
Defendants,
Civil No.

910400358

IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC.,
Third Party Plaintiff
vs.
MIKE MACRIS,
Judge: Guy R. Burningham
Third-party Defendant

Plaintiff, Defendants, and Third-Party Defendants, by and
through their respective counsel, hereby stipulate and agree as
follows:

MALRIS iTP

(EC)

1.

That the discovery cut off in this matter shall be

extended through December 1, 1994.
2.

That Defendants Images & Attitude, Inc. and Thomas Mower

shall provide the Plaintiff with an up-dated witness list not later
than September 16, 1994, which witness list may be supplemented
thereafter.
3.

That

the Plaintiff withdraws

its Motion

in Limine,

without prejudice.
4.

That the parties respectfully request the Court to adopt

the stipulations set forth herei

9
DATED this

'

V

-

day of September, 1^94.
DENNIS K. POOLE
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Defendants and
Third-Party Plaintiffs

THOMAS R. KARRENBERG
ANDERSON 5 KARRENBERG
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Third-Party Defendants

MACRIS.STP
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DENNIS K. POOLE
(2625)
ANDREA NUFFER
(6623)
DENNIS K. POOLE AND ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Defendants
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
(801) 263-3344
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC.,
ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC., a Utah
corporation; and THOMAS MOWER, an
individual,
Defendants,
Civil No.

910400358

IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC.,
Third Party Plaintiff
vs .
MIKE MACRIS,
Judge: Guy R. Burningham
Third-party Defendant

Based upon the Stipulation of the parties hereto, and for good
cause appearing, it is hereby
ORDERED as follows:

MAORIS.OHD

IEC)
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1.

That the discovery cut off in this matter be and is

hereby extended through December 1, 1994.
2.

That Defendants Images & Attitude, Inc. and Thomas Mower

shall provide the Plaintiff with an up-dated witness list on or
before September 16, 1994, which witness list may thereafter be
supplemented.
3.

Plaintiff's Motion in Limine be and is hereby withdrawn,

without prejudice.
ORDER DATED this

day of September, 1994,
BY THE COURT:

I ^ COURT JUDG

?~ 9- ?</
THOMAS R. KARRENBERG
ANDERSON & KARRENBERC
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Third-Party Defendants

MACRIS.OHD

(EC)

2
A-7

1451

*^tfyDENNIS K. POOLE (2625)
ANDREA NUFFER
(6623)
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Defendants
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah
84107
Telephone: (801) 263-3344
i

in in

nv

1 1 in i i

r'onRTH iTUDTfTAL DISTRICT COURT

IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, I N C . ,
D E F E N D A N T

I M A G E S # S

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF'S THIRD SET OF
INTERROGATORIES TO DEFENDANT

Fiain^-iLf

s
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC.,
a Utah corporation, and
THOMAS MOWER, an individual.
Defendants .

CA SE I IC

IMAGES & i \ T'Tl I I Ji: I:

9J 0400358

Third-Party Plaintiff,
JUDGE GUY R. BURNINGHAM

- v s ••

MIKE MACRIS,
ThIrd•Party Def endan;
DEFENDANT

IMAGES

rnrr-uqr. :*

a-:c:neys(

hereby

supplements its resrr^.r.r to Fxaiiiiiii' s Inird Set 01 Interrogate ries to Defendants .*.

. !nws:

MACRIS\SUPRES3.INT {AN)
10007-06051

-/

INTERROGATORY NO ,_ JL 5 ; Ident ify a I ] persons whom you intend to
c a 11 a s a w i t n a s s a t th e 11: i a ] ::: f 11 :i :i s i i: i.a 1 1 a i:
ANSWER:
Defendant Images i ntends to cal] the following individuals as
wi tnesses a1: •.;.

:

. ma11ar :

Thomas :.- .;j^er

M:;jr^. .

. ' •'•.', J - : : O

Janielle Reynolds
> ; a ir]:i ei

Randall Johns ton
Haydon Cameron
Michae] Macr i s
Valeria Maoris
Jim Tate
\ J'i ] 1 :i a i i: m. C r :i si tie n

Kathryr Duffy
Si is...

.•.

-

. i

GeorgGLie KaIcuais
John

M ark
F] DOT

MAC RIS\SUPRES 3.INT (AN)
10007-06051

O

A $

Defendant Images may call the following:
Gleni i ri llotsc i 1
G enev i eve To utaIne
Elizabeth Webber
Connie 'v "alley
Sharon Young

broti Mower
Harry Mower

taken in this .
DATED thj.£

.-oiaced acLi-ons.
day oir"Ja»uary, 1995.

"DENITIS^K. POOLE
— — ANDREA NUFFER
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant Images

MACRIS\SUPRES3.INT (AN)
10007-06051
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;
:
M A T r::-- '"""•'.riFiCAijS
T

hereby cer^i:^

.....a.- -^ .. u-» and rorrec^- copy of the foregoing

DEFENDANT IMAGE'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S THIRD SET OF
INTERROGATORIES

:
i

:

2. i i 1 N< >

9 ] 0 10 03 5 8 w e i : • = ma i ] eel, U.S. Mail,

postage pre-paid tc the followingi
Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq.
Nathan B. Wilcox, Esq.
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
50 West Broadway, Suite 700
Salt I jake City, Utah 84101
j o n v. Harper, Esq.
1059 First Avenue
Salt Lake City, Uta..
this

//

day of January, I'-?"; "
\
/

MACRIS\SUPRES3.INT (AN)
10007-06051

1i

tfj£jt<*<>.

m THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTx
\
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CASE NO. 910400358

MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC.
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Plaintiff,
DATE: JUNE 6, 1995

vs.
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC.,
a Utah corporation, and

MEMORANDUM DECISION

THOMAS MOWER, an individual,
Defendants.

IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC.,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
MIKE MACRIS,
Third-Party Defendant.

This matter came on regularly for trial before the Court on February 16, 17, 21,
22, 24, and 27, 1995, and March 27, 1995. The Plaintiff appeared and was represented by
counsel Thomas R. Karrenberg, Jon V. Harper, and Nathan B. Wilcox. The Defendant and
Third-Party Plaintiff appeared and was represented by Dennis K. Poole, Andrea Nuffer, and
Nancy Mismash. The Third-Party Defendant appeared and was represented by Thomas R.
Karrenberg, Jon V. Harper, and Nathan B. Wilcox. The Court thereupon heard evidence by
the parties and witnesses in support of their respective positions, reviewed the file and
exhibits and upon being advised in the premises now finds and concludes as follows:
FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS
1. The Plaintiff, Macris & Associates, Inc. is a Utah Corporation.

A-12
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2. The Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, Images & Attitude, Inc. is a Utah
Corporation with its principal place of business located in Utah County, State of Utah.
3. Third-Party Defendant, Mike Macris is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.
4. Plaintiff was a corporate distributor for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff.
5. Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff operated a multilevel marketing business out
of Salem, Utah at times pertinent to this matter.
6. Multilevel marketing is promoted as an opportunity to bring other people into a
business by " sponsoringH them and share in the profits that those people bring in by
sponsoring other people creating what is called a "downline.M More people create a greater
volume of sales upon which the earlier sponsors receive a percentage as compensation.
There is an incentive to build an organization (downline) so that future income will be at a
much greater amount because of the volume created by the organization. One incentive is to
"sacrifice" in the beginning, working hard, while the money eventually grows through the
duplicating efforts of "building the business." Encouragement to build "width" is usually a
part of the contract with sponsors, requiring "break away" organizations to be built, thus
creating "executive" levels for the original or early sponsors, so that the company will also
continue to grow . In this action, Plaintiff was not paid very much money in the early
months, when it worked the hardest on its distributorship.
7. Plaintiff and Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff entered into an agreement
which waived the normal requirements required of ordinary sponsors. Plaintiff was
considered to have special expertise and connections that would benefit the Defendant and
Third-Party Plaintiff, thereby justifying the waiver of certain requirements. As an incentive
and consideration to Plaintiff to join Defendant organization and sponsor some of its
connections, Defendant waived all qualifications under its marketing plan, pursuant to an
"Addendum to Distributor Application", with hand printed language noting, "Ultimate

2
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objective is to develop each distributorship according to the width projects of the marketing
plan" and "as long as the distributors are active in promoting Images and Images products."
The language was proposed by the Defendant and was inserted on the Joanne Cameron
addendum by Mr. Thomas Mower and inserted on the Macris & Associates and Margie
Hunsaker addendum by Mike Macris at Mr. Mower's request.
8. The arrangement seemed to have worked without major problems from August
1989 through March 7, 1991. No time frame was established to meet the "ultimate
objective," but progress was being made during the time the parties were working together.
9. Plaintiff recruited Margie Hunsaker into Defendant and assisted her in building
her organization in depth and width, which was contemplated in the parties contract.
10.

Plaintiff used its efforts to build the Hunsaker organization, before it developed

its own organizational width, which was the agreement of the parties. Defendant was aware
of this procedure by its review of the monthly reports of Plaintiff and never complained until
1991.
11. Plaintiff introduced an individual named Glenn Tillotson to the Defendant
organization. Mr. Tillotson had significant experience in building a large multilevel
marketing organization. Although Mr. Tillotson did not personally join Defendant
organization, he assisted in building the Hunsaker organization, which benefitted Defendant.
12. Haydon and Joanne Cameron are individuals Plaintiff recruited into Defendant.
At the time of recruitment, Mr. Cameron had significant experience in multilevel marketing
and in placing articles and advertisements in the national media regarding multilevel
marketing opportunities and products.
13. Plaintiff presented adequate and credible evidence of "actively promoting"
Defendant's products from August 1989 until 1991, when Defendant terminated Plaintiff.
Meetings were attended, individuals were recruited, products were promoted, training,
motivation, and travel were accomplished by the Plaintiff. The expenditure of money was
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made by the Plaintiff to accomplish these activities. These activities were done by the
Plaintiff to promote Defendant and Defendant's products.
14.

At all times relevant to this action Plaintiff was "active in promoting Images

and Images' products." In addition, Plaintiff complied with the terms and conditions of its
contract with the Defendant, which entitled Plaintiff to be paid at the highest level of
Defendant's marketing plan.
15.

In or about February 1991, through the assistance of Plaintiff and the hard

work of Margie Hunsaker and Glenn Tillotson, the Hunsaker distributorship became the first
Images distributorship to achieve the Presidential level in Defendant's marketing plan of 12
front-line qualified executives. This was Defendant's most successful distributorship during
the period from August 1989 through August 1992, at which time Neways took over the
multilevel operation.
16.

In an undated letter, received by the Plaintiff April 27, 1990, Defendant

notified the Plaintiff that its autoqualification status under the addendum to distributor
application was being terminated. This termination notice was sent at a time when the
earnings of Plaintiff were increasing significantly (as was anticipated in the bargain) and
Plaintiffs April 1990 check was several thousand dollars less than it should have been under
the addendum agreement.
17.

Plaintiff immediately contacted Thomas Mower in his hotel room in California

and complained about the termination of Plaintiffs autoqualification status under the
addendum. Defendant ultimately withdrew the attempted termination.
18.

In the summer of 1990, several users of Defendant's nail care system began to

experience irritation problems. Many of those users became sensitized to Defendant's nail
gel.
19.

In an attempt to develop or locate a suitable nail gel, Mike Macris, on behalf

of Affinity, Inc., had individuals sample various gels to determine whether they could use the
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gels without irritation and to determine whether other characteristics of the gels were
appropriate.
20. Affinity, Inc. provided gel samples to Margie Hunsaker, who had tried various
gel samples for Affinity even before becoming an Images distributor. Affinity also provided
samples to Ms. Reynolds, who had become sensitized to Defendant's gel. Affinity also
provided gel samples to the Defendant to allow Defendant's personnel and distributors to try
the samples.
21.

In a letter dated August 31, 1990, addressed to wMike Macris Affinity,"

Thomas Mower, on behalf of Defendant, noted that Affinity had provided new gels to
distributors to test before Defendant had seen the new gels. Mr. Mower explained that he
had not seen Affinity's new gel but had heard about it from distributors. Mr. Mower
requested that Affinity not supply any gels to Defendant's distributors to sample unless
Defendant was also given the gels.
22.

Following the August 31, 1990 letter, Mr. Macris, on behalf of Affinity,

always provided Defendant with any new gel before any distributors sampled the gel.
23.

Defendant also began testing its own gels on its distributors, including Ms.

Hunsaker and Ms. Reynolds. Ms. Hunsaker reported to Mr. Mower her impressions of any
new gel she tried for Affinity. Mr. Mower never instructed her not to test or sample
Affinity gels.
24.

Plaintiff never supplied gels to any Defendant distributors.

25.

In June 1990, Defendant hired Mike Macris to serve as National Sales

Director. As part of his compensation, Mr. Macris was to receive a commission of 1/4% of
Defendant's gross sales.
26. Mr. Mower told Mr. Macris that while he served as National Sales Director,
Plaintiff would be deemed to be active in promoting Defendant's products under the
addendum, stating "its all the same."
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27. In early August 1990, Mr. Macris voluntarily resigned from his position with
the Defendant as National Sales Director due to disputes with Defendant over the promised
commission and business practices of the Defendant.
28.

In response, Defendant sent Mike Macris a letter dated August 9, 1990,

terminating him effective September 1, 1990. Defendant stated they would not pay Mr.
Macris the commission on all sales, but would on sales in the United States.
29. In Plaintiffs downline activity report generated in September 1990 for the
month of August 1990, Defendant deleted the Jorita McGregor line from Plaintiffs
downline. Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant dated October 11, 1990, complaining about the
deletion of this distributor from the downline. Defendant returned the distributor to the
downline.
30. Delays in payment of checks owing to Plaintiff by the Defendant caused
additional difficulties between the parties including involving attorney involvement
demanding payment and delivery of monies due.
31.

On November 7, 1990 a meeting was held in Salem, Utah at Defendant's

headquarters with Thomas Mower, the Plaintiff and Plaintiffs attorney, in part to persuade
Defendant to release a check being held by Defendant payable to the Plaintiff.
32.

Several matters were discussed in addition to the above matter, including a

request by Thomas Mower for a new addendum agreement with the Plaintiff. The new
agreement called for Plaintiff to reach presidential level (12 qualified executives front-line to
Plaintiff). Plaintiff said he would consider the proposal and Mr. Mower was to memorialize
it in writing. The check in question was ultimately delivered at this meeting.
33.

The parties continued to have difficulties and discuss new agreements into

January 1991. The parties were never able to come to new terms. Defendant unilaterally
imposed a time limitation of two years from January 1991, for Plaintiff to achieve
presidential status and imposed a higher standard of MactiveM which would allow Defendant to
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terminate the distributorship prior to the end of the two years for lack of requisite "activity"
at the higher level. Plaintiff was willing to agree to a two-year term, even though no new
consideration was offered by Defendant to plaintiff for such agreement. Plaintiff was
unwilling to agree to the higher standard of MactiveHand termination terms being proposed.
34. At this time Plaintiff and Defendant were unable to reach a new agreement to
replace the addendum. Both parties were aware that the earnings of Plaintiff were going to
increase dramatically, as had been anticipated since the inception of the original agreement.
35.

In a letter to Plaintiff dated March 7, 1991, and received by the Plaintiff on

March 11, 1991, Defendant informed Plaintiff that it was discontinuing the autoqualification
status of the distributorship for lack of activity. Based upon the level of activity of the
Plaintiff, this act constituted a material breach of the contract between the parties, by the
Defendant.
36.

Macris & Associates, Inc. fulfilled its responsibilities under the contract.

37. Defendant ceased making payments pursuant to the contract and
suspended/terminated the Addendum for Plaintiff, thus breaching the contract.
38.

At the time of the March 7, 1991 letter, Plaintiffs earnings were increasing

dramatically.
39. The Defendant warned the Plaintiff in March 1991, after already terminating the
autoqualification status, not to supply gels to Defendant's distributors, or it may be grounds
for terminating Plaintiff. Plaintiff never tested gels or provided gels to Defendant's
distributors.
40. In a letter dated March 29, 1991, after already terminating the autoqualification
status and failing to pay Plaintiff for the month of February 1991, Defendant gave Plaintiff
"formal" notice that it was considering termination of its distributorship. The reasons given
were testing gels after warnings not to do so, lack of activity under the Addendum, and
damaging activity against Defendant and its distributor force.

7
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41. The three reasons given above were all without merit.
42. After demand by Plaintiffs attorney, Defendant failed and refused to pay
Plaintiff for the month of February 1991, or thereafter.
43. The money not paid by the Defendant was retained by Defendant and benefitted
the Defendant, to the detriment, injury and damage to the Plaintiff.
44.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's wrongful and material breach

of its contract with Plaintiff, Plaintiff has suffered damages in the amount of $9,638.96 for
the month of February 1991, which amount the court has already entered partial summary
judgment if favor of the Plaintiff.
45. The amounts which should have been paid by Defendant to Plaintiff for
subsequent months are as follows:
March 1991

$15,112.33

April 1991

22,221.57

May 1991

24,865.61

June 1991

22,905.35

July 1991

27,227.69

August 1991

23,913.41

September 1991

27,063.79

October 1991

28,627.10

November 1991

20,890.65

December 1991

15,974.44

January 1992

18,928.07

February 1992

17,854.18

March 1992

18,122.16

April 1992

15,911.97

May 1992

13,364.27
8
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June 1992

12,692.71

July 1992

12,103.22

August 1992

13,263.72

46. Defendant received the benefit of its bargain and wrongfully terminated the
Plaintiffs Addendum.
47. Had Defendant continued to honor the bargain, the Plaintiff would have received
payments, based upon the formula of $360,681.20. This amount constitutes Plaintiffs
damages as a result of Defendant's breach.
48. The damages above are a liquidated amount and could be calculated as they
came due. Plaintiff is entitled to pre-judgment interest in the amount of $116,087.49, as of
February 16, 1995. After February 16, 1995, per diem prejudgment interest is $98.82 and
interest on the judgment at the rate of 9.22% after the date judgment is entered.
49.

Following Defendant's breach of the contract, neither the Plaintiff nor Third

Party Defendant was contractually restricted from competing with the Defendant.
50. Third Party Defendant's activities on behalf of the new company Emily Rose
were not done either as agent or representative for the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff never had any
contractual relationship with Emily Rose.
51. Neither Plaintiff nor Third Party Defendant interfered with Defendant's
contractual relations, potential contractual relations, or existing or potential economic
relations. Defendant has not been damaged by any acts of either the Plaintiff or the Third
Party Defendant.
52.

Plaintiff is not the alter ego of Third Party Defendant, nor is Third Party

Defendant the alter ego of the Plaintiff. Each maintained their separate legal personalities.
53. The Distributor application between Plaintiff and Defendant and the addendum
thereto constituted an integrated contract between the parties.
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54. Plaintiff performed according to all conditions of the contract until Defendant
wrongfully breached the contract.
55. Defendant failed to establish that any alleged breach of contractual relations by
Plaintiff or Third Party Defendant injured or caused damage to Defendants.
56. Neither Plaintiff nor Third Party Defendant intentionally interfered with or
procured any breach of any contract with any Defendant distributor or potential distributor.
57. Neither Plaintiff nor Third Party Defendant acted maliciously, intentionally,
recklessly, or fraudulently. Punitive damages would not be appropriate.
58. Defendant and Third Party Plaintiffs claims against the Plaintiff and Third
Party Defendant are without merit or legal basis and will be dismissed with prejudice.

Counsel for the Plaintiff is directed to prepare, serve opposing counsel and submit
appropriate findings of fact, conclusions of law and Judgment consistent with this decision.

Dated this fc? day of June, 1995.

BY THE COURT:

BURNINSfiAM,/K0tjE

cc: Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq.; Nathan B. Wilcox, Esq.
Jon V. Harper, Esq.
Dennis K. Poole, Esq.; Andrea Nuffer, Esq.; Nancy Mismash, Esq.
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1349 Bryan Avenue
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
Nathan B. Wilcox (#6685)
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
(801) 534-1700
Attorneys for Plaintiff Macris & Associates, Inc. and Third-Party Defendant Mike Macris
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC.,
Plaintiff,

;

vs.

]
)
])

IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC.,
a Utah corporation, and
THOMAS MOWER, an individual,

]
]
;

Defendants.
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC.,
Third-Party Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

]
]

vs.

;
) Civil No. 910400358
]) Judge Guy R. Burningham

MIKE MACRIS,

]

Third-Party Defendant.

]
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This matter came on regularly for trial before the Court on February 16, 17, 21, 22, 24,
and 27, 1995, and March 27, 1995. Plaintiff Macris & Associates, Inc. ("Plaintiff") and ThirdParty Defendant Michael Macris ("Macris") appeared and were represented by counsel Thomas
R. Karrenberg, Jon V. Harper, and Nathan B. Wilcox. The Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff
Images & Attitude, Inc. ("Defendant") appeared and was represented by Dennis K. Poole,
Andrea Nuffer, and Nancy Mismash. The Court thereupon heard evidence by the parties and
witnesses in support of their respective positions, reviewed the file and exhibits and upon being
advised in the premises now finds and concludes as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff Macris & Associates, Inc. is a Utah corporation which has been in

existence since November 1985.
2.

Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Images & Attitude, Inc., is a Utah

Corporation with its principal place of business located in Utah County, State of Utah.
3.

Third-Party Defendant Macris is an individual residing in Salt Lake County, State

of Utah.
4.

Defendant operated a multilevel marketing business out of Salem, Utah, until

August 31, 1992, at which time Defendant ceased to operate the multilevel marketing operation
and transferred it to Neways, Inc.
5.

Plaintiff was a corporate distributor for Defendant.

6.

Thomas E. Mower ("Mower") founded Defendant and served as its President at

least through August 31, 1992. Mower is also President of Neways.
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7.

Multilevel marketing is promoted as an opportunity to bring other people into a

business by "sponsoring" them and share in the profits that those people bring in by sponsoring
other people creating what is called a "downline." More people create a greater volume of sales
upon which the earlier sponsors receive a percentage as compensation. There is an incentive
to build an organization (downline) so that future income will be at a much greater amount
because of the volume created by the organization. Encouragement to build "width" is usually
a part of the contract with sponsors, requiring "break away" organizations to be built, thus
creating "executive" levels for the original or early sponsors, so that the company will also
continue to grow. One incentive is to "sacrifice" in the beginning, working hard, while the
money eventually grows through the duplicating efforts of "building the business."
8.

Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an agreement which waived the normal

requirements for ordinary distributors. Plaintiff was considered to have special expertise and
connections that would benefit Defendant, thereby justifying the waiver of certain requirements.
As an incentive and consideration to Plaintiff to join Defendant's organization and sponsor some
of Plaintiff's connections, Defendant waived all qualifications under it marketing plan, pursuant
to an "Addendum to Distributor Application," with hand printed language noting, "Ultimate
objective is to develop each distributorship according to the width projects of the marketing
plan" and "as long as the distributors are active in promoting Images and Images products." The
language was proposed by the Defendant and was inserted by Macris on the Plaintiff's
Addendum at Mower's request, changing the wording of the second hand-printed phrase as
follows: "As long as Distributor is active in promoting Images and Images products."
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9.

No time frame was established to meet the "ultimate objective," but progress was

being made during the time the parties were working together. Similarly, no criteria were
established to determine what was meant by being "active in promoting Images and Images
products."
10.

The Distributor Application and the Addendum to Distributor Application together

became the contract between Plaintiff and Defendant.
11.

Plaintiff recruited Margie Hunsaker Aliprandi ("Hunsaker") into Defendant and

assisted her in building her organization in depth and width, which was contemplated in the
parties' contract.
12.

Plaintiff and Hunsaker agreed verbally at the time they executed the Addendums

that they would work together to build the width of the Hunsaker distributorship to the
Presidential level of Defendant's marketing plan before building out Plaintiff's organizational
width.

Images was aware of the agreement to build out Hunsaker's distributorship first.

Defendant was also aware that Plaintiff placed distributors under the Hunsaker distributorship
rather than directly under its own distributorship. Defendant was aware of this procedure by
its review of the monthly reports of Plaintiff and never complained until 1991.
13.

Plaintiff introduced Glenn Tillotson ("Tillotson") to Defendant. Tillotson had

significant experience in building a large multilevel marketing organization. Tillotson assisted
in building the Hunsaker organization, which benefitted Defendant.
14.

Plaintiff also recruited Hay don and Joanne Cameron (the "Camerons") into

Defendant. Haydon Cameron had significant experience in multilevel marketing and in placing
4
A-25

articles and advertisements in the national media concerning multilevel marketing opportunities
and products.
15.

Plaintiff presented adequate and credible evidence of its activity from August 1989

through March 1991, in "promoting Images and Images products." The evidence shows that
Plaintiff was active in promoting Defendant and Defendant's products by attending meetings,
recruiting individuals, promoting Defendant's products, developing marketing strategies, training
and motivating other distributors for Defendant, consulting with Defendant on ways to improve
its marketing plan, and travelling for Defendant. Plaintiff expended money, including financial
support to a down line distributor for travel expenses, to accomplish these activities.
16.

At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was "active in promoting Images and

Images products." In addition, Plaintiff complied with the terms and conditions of its contract
with Defendant which entitled Plaintiff to be paid at the highest level of Defendant's marketing
plan and to maintain its status as distributor for Defendant. Throughout the period from August
1989 until March 1991, Defendant paid Plaintiff at the highest level of Defendant's marketing
plan, according to the Addendum.
17.

In or about February 1991, through the assistance of Plaintiff and the hard work

of Hunsaker and Tillotson, the Hunsaker distributorship became the first distributorship in
Defendant's organization to achieve the presidential level in Defendant's marketing plan of 12
front-line qualified executives. This was Defendant's most successful distributorship during the
period from August 1989 through August 1992, at which time Neways took over the multilevel
marketing operation.
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18.

In spite of Plaintiffs activity level in the first half of 1990, Defendant notified

Plaintiff in an undated letter received on April 27, 1990, that its autoqualification status under
the Addendum to Distributor Application was being terminated. This termination notice was
sent at a time when Plaintiffs earnings from its distributorship were increasing significantly (as
was anticipated in the bargain) and meant that Plaintiffs April 1990 check was several thousand
dollars less than it should have been under the Addendum.
19.

Plaintiff immediately contacted Mower in his hotel room in California and

complained about the termination of Plaintiffs autoqualification status under the Addendum.
Defendant ultimately withdrew the attempted termination.
20.

In the summer of 1990, several users of Defendant's nail care system began to

experience irritation problems. Many of those users became sensitized to Defendant's nail gel.
21.

In the attempt to develop or locate a suitable nail gel, Macris, on behalf of

Affinity, Inc. ("Affinity") — a compriy in which Macris was involved but which was separate
and distinct from Plaintiff and had its own contractual relationship with Defendant as a supplier had individuals sample various gels to determine whether they could use the gels without
irritation and to determine whether other characteristics of the gels were appropriate.
22.

Affinity, Inc. provided gel samples to Hunsaker, who had tried various gel

samples for Affinity even before becoming a distributor for Defendant. Affinity also provided
various gel samples to Ms. Reynolds, who had become sensitized to Defendant's gel. Affinity
also provided gel samples to Defendant to allow Defendant's personnel and various distributors
to try the samples.
6
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23.

In a letter dated August 31, 1990, addressed to "Mike Maoris Affinity," Mower,

on behalf of Defendant, noted that Affinity had provided new gels to distributors to test before
Defendant had seen the new gels. Mower explained that he had not seen Affinity's new gel but
had heard about it from distributors. Mower requested that Affinity not supply any gels to
Defendant's distributors to sample unless Defendant was also given the gels.
24.

Following the August 31, 1990 letter, Maoris, on behalf of Affinity, always

provided Defendant with any new gel before any distributor sampled the gel.
25.

Defendant also began testing its own new gels on its distributors, including on

Hunsaker and Ms. Reynolds - the two distributors who tried Affinity's new gels. Hunsaker
reported to Mower her impressions of any new gel she tried for Affinity.

Mower never

instructed her not to test or sample Affinity's gels.
26.

Plaintiff never tested or otherwise provided gels to any of Defendant's

distributors.
27.

In June 1990, Defendant hired Macris to serve as National Sales Director. As

part of his compensation, Macris was to receive a commission of 1/4% of Defendant's gross
sales.
28.

Mower told Macris that, because he was the principal person operating Plaintiff's

distributorship, while he served as National Sales Director, Plaintiff would be deemed to be
active in promoting Defendant and Defendant's products under the Addendum, stating "it's all
the same."
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29.

In early August 1990, Macris voluntarily resigned from his position with

Defendant as National Sales Director due to disputes with Defendant over the promised
commission and business practices of Defendant.
30.

In response, Defendant sent Macris a letter dated August 9, 1990, terminating him

effective September 1, 1990. Defendant stated that it would not pay Macris the promised
commission on all of its sales — only on sales in the United States.
31.

In Plaintiffs downline activity report generated in September 1990 for the month

of August 1990, Defendant deleted the Jorita McGregor line from Plaintiff's downline. Plaintiff
sent a letter to Defendant dated October 11, 1990, complaining about the intentional deletion of
this distributor from the downline. Defendant returned the distributor to the downline.
32.

Delays in payment of checks owing to Plaintiff by Defendant caused additional

difficulties between the parties including the need for attorney involvement demanding payment
and delivery of monies due.
33.

On November 7, 1990 a meeting was held in Salem, Utah at Defendant's

headquarters with Mower, Plaintiff and Plaintiff's attorney, in part to persuade Defendant to
release a check being held by Defendant payable to Plaintiff.
34.

In the November 7, 1990 meeting, several matters were discussed in addition to

the above matter, including a request by Mower for a new addendum with Plaintiff. The new
agreement called for Plaintiff to reach the presidential level (12 qualified executives front-line
to Plaintiff) within two years. Plaintiff indicated that it would consider the proposal, which
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Mower was to memorialize in writing. The check in question was ultimately delivered to
Plaintiff.
35.

The parties continued to have difficulties and discussed new agreements into

January 1991. The parties were never able to agree to new terms. Defendant insisted upon
imposing a time limitation of two years from January 1991, for Plaintiff to achieve presidential
status, and imposing a higher standard of "active" which would allow Defendant to terminate
Plaintiff's distributorship prior to the end of the two years for lack of requisite activity at the
higher level.

Plaintiff was willing to agree to a two-year term, even though no new

consideration was offered by Defendant to Plaintiff for such agreement. Plaintiff was unwilling
to agree to the higher standard of "active" and the termination terms being proposed.
36.

At the time Plaintiff and Defendant were unable to reach a new agreement to

replace the Addendum, both parties were aware that Plaintiffs earnings were going to increase
dramatically, as had been anticipated since the inception of the original agreement.
37.

In a letter to Plaintiff dated March 7, 1991, and received by Plaintiff on March

11, 1991, Defendant informed Plaintiff that it was discontinuing the autoqualification status of
the distributorship for lack of activity. There was no mention of any other basis for Defendant's
action in that letter. Based upon the level of activity of Plaintiff, this act constituted a material
breach of the contract between the parties, by the Defendant.
38.

Plaintiff fulfilled its responsibilities under the contract and had been "active in

promoting Images and Images products."
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39.

At the time of the March 7, 1991 letter, Plaintiffs earnings were increasing

dramatically.
40.

Defendant warned Plaintiff in March 1991, after already terminating Plaintiffs

autoqualification status, not to supply gels to Defendant's distributors, or it may be grounds for
terminating Plaintiff.

Plaintiff never tested or otherwise provided gels to Defendant's

distributors.
41.

In a letter dated March 29, 1991, after already terminating Plaintiffs

autoqualification status and failing to pay Plaintiff for the month of February 1991, Defendant
gave Plaintiff "formal" notice that it was considering termination of its distributorship. The
reasons given were testing gels after warnings not to do so, lack of activity under the
Addendum, and damaging activity against Defendant and its distributor force. The evidence did
not support the stated reasons for termination, all of which were without merit. Plaintiff had
not engaged in conduct which violated Plaintiffs policies and procedures or the contract.
42.

The reasons given by Defendant for terminating Plaintiff after already terminating

Plaintiffs autoqualification status and failing to pay Plaintiff for the month of February 1991,
were all pretextual and without merit, and did not justify termination of Plaintiff.
43.

After demand by Plaintiffs attorney, Defendant failed and refused to pay Plaintiff

for the month of February 1991, or thereafter.
44.

The money not paid by Defendant was retained by Defendant and benefitted

Defendant, to the detriment, injury and damage to the Plaintiff.
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45.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's wrongful and material breach of

its contract with Plaintiff, Plaintiff has suffered damages in the amount of $9,638.96 for the
month of February 1991, which amount the Court has already entered partial summary judgment
in favor of the Plaintiff.
46.

Also as a direct and proximate result of Defendant's wrongful and material breach

of its contract with Plaintiff, Plaintiff has suffered damages for amounts which Defendant should
have paid to Plaintiff for subsequent months, from March 1991 through August 1992, when
Neways took over the multilevel marketing operation. Defendant has stipulated to the following
amounts for those months:
March 1991

15,112.33

April 1991

22,221.57

May 1991

24,865.61

June 1991

22,905.35

July 1991

27,227.69

August 1991

23,913.41

September 1991

27,063.79

October 1991

28,627.10

November 1991

20,890.65

December 1991

15,974.44

January 1992

18,928.07

February 1992

17,854.18
11
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March 1992

18,122.16

April 1992

15,911.97

May 1992

13,364.27

June 1992

12,692.71

July 1992

12,103.22

August 1992

13,263.72

Defendant received the benefit of its bargain and wrongfully terminated the

Plaintiffs Addendum.
48.

Had Defendant continued to honor the bargain, Plaintiff would have received

payments of $360,681.20 through August 31, 1992. This amount constitutes Plaintiffs damages
through August 31, 1992 as a result of Defendant's breach.
49.

The damages above are a liquidated amount and could be calculated as they came

due. Plaintiff is entitled to pre-Judgment interest in the amount of $116,087.49, as of February
16, 1995. After February 16, 1995, per diem prejudgment interest is $98.82 and interest on the
judgment at the rate of 9.22 % after the date judgment is entered.
50.

Following Defendant's breach of the contract, neither Plaintiff nor Third-Party

Defendant Macris was contractually restricted from competing with the Defendant.
51.

There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that Plaintiff breached

its contract with Defendant.
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52.

Macris's activities on behalf of the new company Emily Rose were not done either

as an agent or representative for the Plaintiff. Plaintiff never had any contractual relationship
with Emily Rose.
53.

There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that either Plaintiff or

Macris interfered with Defendant's contractual relations or potential contractual relations, or that
either Plaintiff or Macris interfered with Defendant's existing or potential economic relations.
There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that Defendant was injured or damaged
by any alleged acts of interference by either Plaintiff or Macris.
54.

There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that any contracts or

potential contracts with Defendant were breached as a result of either Plaintiff's or Macris's
alleged actions.
55.

There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that either Plaintiff or

Macris engaged in any activities for the purpose of wrongfully interfering with Defendant's
existing or potential contractual relations.
56.

There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that either Plaintiff or

Macris intentionally interfered with Defendant's existing or potential economic relations for an
improper purpose which predominated over any other purpose, or that either Plaintiff or Macris
used improper means to intentionally interfere with Defendant's existing or potential economic
relations.
57.

There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that Macris &

Associates, Inc. is the alter ego of Michael Macris, or that Michael Macris is the alter ego of
13
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Macris & Associates, Inc. There was ample evidence that adequate corporate formalities were
met and that each maintained their separate legal personalities.
58.

There was not adequate or credible evidence to establish that observance of the

corporate distinction between Plaintiff and Macris sanctioned a fraud, promoted an injustice or
resulted in an inequity.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The following Conclusions of Law are in addition to those Findings of Fact set forth
hereinabove which may be properly characterized as Conclusions of Law:
1.

The Distributor Application between Plaintiff and Defendant and the Addendum

thereto constituted a single integrated contract between Plaintiff and Defendant.
2.

Based on Plaintiffs level of activity, Plaintiff, at all times relevant, was "active

in promoting Images and Images products." Plaintiff performed according to all conditions of
the contract between the parties until Defendant wrongfully breached the contract.
3.

Defendant materially breached the contract between the parties when it suspended

Plaintiffs autoqualification status for lack of activity, through its letter dated March 7, 1991.
4.

Defendant also materially breached the contract between the parties when it ceased

paying Plaintiff under the contract between the parties.
5.

As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's material breach(es), Plaintiff

suffered damages through August 31, 1992 in the stipulated amount of $360,681.20, plus prejudgment interest thereon in the amount of $116,087.49 as of February 16, 1995.
February 16, 1995, per diem prejudgment interest is $98.82.
14
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6.

Plaintiff is not the alter ego of Third-Party Defendant, nor is Third-Party

Defendant the alter ego of Plaintiff. Each maintained their separate legal personalities and the
observance of the corporate distinction between Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant would not
sanction a fraud, promote an injustice or result in an inequity. Therefore, Defendant's First
Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant, based on alter ego, is without merit
or legal basis and shall be dismissed with prejudice.
7.

Plaintiff performed according to all of the conditions of its contract with

Defendant until Defendant wrongfully breached the contract, and Plaintiff did not materially
breach the contract. Therefore, Defendant's Second Cause of Action, based on breach of
contract, is without merit or legal basis and shall be dismissed with prejudice.
8.

Based on Defendant's stipulation during the trial of this matter, by and through

their counsel, Defendant's Third Cause of Action, lased on defamation, was dismissed with
prejudice.
9.

Defendant failed to establish that either Plaintiff of Third-Party Defendant

intentionally induced any third party, including any of Defendant's distributors, to breach a
contract with Defendant which, as a direct or proximate result, injured or cause damage to
Defendant. As such, Defendant's Fourth Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party
Defendant, based on intentional interference with contractual relations, is without merit or legal
basis and shall be dismissed with prejudice.
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10.

Defendant failed to establish that either Plaintiff or Third-Party Defendant

intentionally interfered with Defendant's existing or potential economic relations for an improper
purpose or by improper means, thereby injuring or causing damage to Defendant. As such,
Defendant's Fifth Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant, based on
intentional interference with economic relations, is without merit or legal basis and shall be
dismissed with prejudice.
11.

Neither Plaintiff's nor Third-Party Defendant's acts or omissions complained of

in any of Defendant's causes of action were the result of willful or malicious or intentionally
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and
disregard of, the rights of others and, therefore, Defendants are not entitled to any punitive
damages. Therefore, Defendant's Seventh Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party
Defendant, based on pUxJtive damages, is without merit or legal basis and shall be dismissed
with prejudice.
12.

Plaintiffs claims are not barred by (1) the statute of frauds, (2) the parol evidence

rule, or (3) the doctrines of laches, waiver or estoppel as Defendants' claimed in the Answer to
Second Amended Complaint.
13.

Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action against Defendant based on declaratory relief

was dismissed with prejudice at trial.
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14.

Plaintiffs Fifth Cause of Action against Defendant based on compression of the

Joann Cameron distributorship was dismissed with prejudice at trial on Plaintiffs motion and
Defendant's stipulation.
15.

Plaintiffs Sixth Cause of Action against Defendant based on participation in the

car fund program was dismissed with prejudice at trial on Defendant's motion and Plaintiffs
stipulation.
16.

Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of Action against Defendant based on unfair trade

practices was dismissed with prejudice by stipulation of the parties prior to trial.
The foregoing findings and conclusions are cross-adopted to the extent a conclusion has
been misidentified as a finding or a finding has been misidentified as a conclusion.
DATED this

day of

^^f^^^A^,

1995.

BY THE COURTS

$r*rS^iM

Judgetjtiy Rj^urningham ..--,/ .•••
APPROVED BY:

'%.

DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES

.•••'''&
^"^saeel'^

Dennis K. Poole
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff
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Jon V. Harper (#1378)
1349 Bryan Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
(801) 597-5022
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
Nathan B. Wilcox (#6685)
700 Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006
(801) 534-1700

M

WnOHLMED^/^/^

Attorneys for Plaintiff Macris & Associates, Inc. and Third-Party Defendant Mike Macris
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MACRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC.,
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC.,
a Utah corporation, and
THOMAS MOWER, an individual,
Defendants.
IMAGES & ATTITUDE, INC.,
Third-Party Plaintiff,

Civil No. 910400358
Judge Guy R. Burningham

vs.
MIKE MACRIS,
Third-Party Defendant.
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This matter came on regularly for trial before the Court on February 16, 17, 21, 22, 24
and 27, 1995 and March 27, 1995. The Plaintiff Macris & Associates, Inc. and Third-Party
Defendant Michael Macris appeared and were represented by counsel, Thomas R. Karrenberg,
Jon V. Harper and Nathan B. Wilcox. The Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Images &
Attitude, Inc. appeared and was represented by Dennis K. Poole, Andrea Nuffer, and Nancy A.
Mismash. The Court thereupon heard evidence by the parties and the witnesses in support of
their respective positions, reviewed the file and exhibits and upon being advised in the premises,
it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Judgment is hereby entered for Plaintiff and against Defendant in the following

amounts: (a) $360,681.20, constituting Plaintiffs damages through August 31, 1992, as a result
of Defendant's breach of its contract with Plaintiff; (b) $126,957.67 constituting pre-judgment
interest on the principal amount as of June 6, 1995; and (c) per diem pre-judgment interest of
$98.82 per day from June 6, 1995 until Judgment is entered by this Court (together representing
the "Judgment Amount"). Following the entry of this Judgment, interest on the Judgment
Amount shall accrue at the rate of 9.22% per annum.
2.

Defendant's First Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant,

based on alter ego, is without merit or legal basis and is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
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10.

Plaintiffs Sixth Cause of Action against Defendant based on participation in the

car fund program was dismissed with prejudice at trial on Defendant's motion and Plaintiff's
stipulation.
11.

Plaintiffs Seventh Cause of Action against Defendant based on unfair trade

practices was dismissed with prejudice by stipulation of the parties prior to trial.
DATED: September _ / £ _ , 1995.
BY THE COURT:

APPROVED BY:
DENNIS K. POOLE & ASSOCIATES

Dennis K. Poole
Attorneys for Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff

0620judg 50a
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3.

Defendant's Second Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant,

based on breach of contract, is without merit or legal basis and is hereby dismissed with
prejudice.
4.

Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiffs Third Cause of Action against Plaintiff and

Third-Party Defendant, based on defamation, was voluntarily dismissed by Defendant and ThirdParty Plaintiff at the conclusion of Plaintiffs case at trial and is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
5.

Defendant's Fourth Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant,

based on intentional interference with contractual relations, is without merit or legal basis and
is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
6.

Defendant's Fifth Cause of Action against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant,

based on intentional interference with economic relations, is without merit or legal basis and is
hereby dismissed with prejudice.
7.

Defendant' s Seventh Cause of A ction against Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendant,

based on punitive damages, is without merit or legal basis and is hereby dismissed with
prejudice.
8.

Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action against Defendant based on declaratory relief

was dismissed with prejudice at trial.
9.

Plaintiffs Fifth Cause of Action against Defendant based on compression of the

Jo Ann Cameron distributorship was dismissed with prejudice at trial on Defendant's motion and
Plaintiff's stipulation.
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ADDENDUM TO DISTRIBUTOR APPLICATION
1. As consideration received by Images the sufficiency of which is
acknowledged by Images, Images agrees to waive ALL qualifications
of applicant which are set forth in the Images marketing plan during
the term of this agreement.
Images agrees to pay distributor
according to the Images marketing plan at the highest levels as set
forth in the Images marketing plan including but not limited to the
commissions, rebates, and bonuses paid at the level of ^fo^fy** and
/Presidential
for the term of this agreement.
. ZV&CKS\\VM. AM*
\)

2. Term. The term of this agreement shall commence on the date
first written in on the distributor application and shall continue V
through out the life of Images. As t o ^ Os D.sY^iSLT-otfi h> Actw-e
3. An arrangement has been made between, Macris and Associates (a
Utah Corporation), Joanne Cameron, and Margie Hunsaker who are all
Images distributors, whereby these distributors have agreed to
aggregate their monthly checks as earned in the form of
Commissions, rebates and bonuses, for the term of this agreement,
and share the aggregate amount by 1/3 each. An example of this
would be if Macris & Associates earned a total of $150.00 in a
calendar month and Joanne Cameron earned a total of $100.00 in a
calendar month and Margerie Hunsaker earned $350.00 in a calendar
month then Images would aggregate the amounts which would total
$600.00 and then divide by 3 and pay each of the above distributors
$200.00 which would be 1/3 each of the aggregated
amount.
Distributor hereby authorizes Images to perform herein as requested
by distributor and as consideration given to Images for performing
as requested herein distributor agrees to indemnify Images and hold
it harmless from any and all liability, including judgements,
attorneys fees and court cost incurred as a result of any losses
Images incurs as a result of performing herein as distributor has
requested.
The foregoing is hereby agreed to by the parties:
$

Macris & Associates

Images International, Inc.
* PLAINTIFF'S
g
EXHIBIT
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"Undgtng Vie Cap Between Science And Human Needs. J
E.400N. SALEM, UTAH 84653 (801) 423-2800 FAX (801) 423-2350

August 3 1 ,

1990

Mike Macris
Affinity
48 tf. 300 S. #1805 N
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 8 4 1 0 1
Dear Mike

This is to inform you of the precarious position we are in because
of your inability to supply the lamp housings we ordered. You have
been prepaid $64,000 with the balance to be paid on delivery for
12,000 units that were supposed to have r been 'delivered
approximately 1 month ago.
I have hired a crew that have sat idly by for 2 weeks awaiting
housings for assembly. I must continue their employment if Z am
to retain their services. Laying them off will put us again in
jeopardy when the time comes to assemble lamps because of having
to hire a new crew.
Are you prepared to pay the costs for
retaining these employees as the fault lies with you for failing
to provide fhe lamps we ordered and prepaid? If you cannot provide
the lamps by September 6th, please return the money advanced as Me
will have to purchase elsewhere.
On other matters.... We left numerous messages on your angering
machine and don't get a response from you.' Much of it has to do
with the afore mentioned situation. However we are continuing to
have enormous problems associated with the use-of your Flex gel,
nail prep and even the Ultra gel. Since* we began re-using your
prep, the irritation rate has dramatically increased. Please stop
passing the buck on the 10% acrylic nail being the culprits * We
went to our formula originally because of the terrific amount of
irritation with your gel and prep. Irritation went down with our
prep, but so did bonding qualities. At your insistence we went
back to your prep. Irritations have increased phenomenally since
then. The downlines that we have so diligently developed are being
destroyed almost as fast aa they are created* The resources of the
company are being taxed in handling the problems created by your
defective gels and nail prep, I believe we should talk about what
compensation is due to Images for these situations, I wish you
could be more available.
I feel that you should be directly
involved with some of the distributors that have initiated lawsuits
against usj as the ultimate responsibility lies in your lap.
I can't tell you how disillusioned I am with your performance in
giving new gels to our distributors to test before the company has
even seen them* This is hardly the type of R&D program I would
expect a supplier to provide. It is also very embarrassing and
erodes both your and our integrity with the field* At this date
we have not yet received your latest gel and only hear about it
from those who are using it.

The two most Important factors we are facing besides the extreme
medical Irritation problems aret
1.

The damage to distributors and their organizations because of
the high failure rate of your system. Once lost these
distributors are gone forever.

2.

Images integrity and reputation is being tarnished and
battered. Your systems failure is hurting old and new
distributors. We are becoming the laughing stock of the
industry. Our once shining reputation is gone. Through
no fault of our own. That's the sad part. Rather because
of the "detrimental reliance" we have placed on you and
Affinity.

It is now very possible that Images may fail or not nearly reach
it's potential growth because of our utilization of your system.
Our backs are against the wall and the adversary we are facing is
not an enemy from without or even just an aggressive competitor.
It is internal.
The integration of Affinity's {cancerous in
nature) gel system; polluting and weakening to the point of
destruction a once healthy, viable, radiant company. Our future
looks very hazy and possibly quite black. To quote P060 "we have
met the eneray, and it is us."
All I can say is thank God the Enquirer did not run the article on
the gel system. If it had, Images would be history by now.
In conclusion let me advise you that we are to a point of
desperation due to these situations. I would advise ,you to act
quickly and appropriately. You have locked us into, a corner and
we are rapidly bleeding to death. Presently you have the only band
aid to stop the flow. Please respond with full solutions by the
date mentioned or we will have to commence major surgery and cut
out the cancer to save the situation.
You seem to think the
business of business is business and that is all, but we feel that
business without integrity has no value. Our association* with
Affinity is rapidly loosing value.
Sincerely,

Thomas Mower
President
cci

Dale Kent/Attorney
1200 Kennecott Blvd
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
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"Bridging Tlie Gap Between Science And Human Needs.."
E.400N. SALEM, UTAH 84653 (801)423-2800 FAX (801)423-2350

March 7, 1991

Mr. Mike Macris
14 Quietwood Lane
Sandy, Utah 84092

' 3

Dear Mike:
It has been some time since we have seen any activity on your
distributorship. Since your agreement to become active in your
distributorship and
fulfill your part; you have not done
anything.
We have monitored your distributorship and have not
seen even one new Distributor signed or any support to downline
or product movement.
I must, therefore, notify you that your
auto-qualification is hereby temporarily discontinued.
When substantial activity is demonstrated, this matter can again
be discussei. Mike, Images has acted in good faith in our Autoqualification Agreement with you. We have always done our part.
I do not feel the same in relation to your activities, in keeping
with your part of the agreement.
It is unfortunate that this step must be taken, but it can be
rectified should you take the necessary action.
Should you
decide not to take the steps to
boost activity on your
distributorship, the
auto-qualification will
be terminated
permanently.
I look forward to seeing you on the printouts.
Sincerely,

^=^T^
Thomas Mower
President
TM/bjs

M
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March 14, 1991

Mike Macris
14 Quietwood Lane
Sandy, at 84092
Dear Mike:
We have been having a considerable
amount of trouble with your
testing of gel products on our Distributors.
Your gel has 'not
been working well.
We have had to spend enormous amounts of
resources in both time and money to get it to perform.
You had
previously passed out your aesthetically appealing version. This
has caused us a great deal of difficulty. As you know, your gel
doesn't bond
well and it yellows; but we have spent almost
510,000 trying to correct that. Distributors are complaining to
us that we* should have used your gel rather than our own. This
is unbelievable. For you to have involved Distributors
in your
testing program with your unproven product has caused a backlash
effect even against your improved version that we moditied.
Now we find that you have talked to Teri Hill about testing a
nail polish that you are developing for Images.
Let me ask you
in plain and simple terms to stop supplying products to our
Distributors. I am telling you to keep out of Images' business
and to leave our Distributors alone in this product evaluation.
They should not be awre of what or with whom we are dealing.
This is the last warning that I am going
to give you.
Do not
violate it again or extreme action will be taken against you.
Finally, in closing, get these defective lamp housings out of
here immediately and get them remanufactured.
I have been
waiting for your answer. We have told you two or three times,
written to you twice and still no response. Now, get it done or
I will take appropriate action in this matter.
I am ready to purchase the balance of the present order of lamp
housings per our agreement.
You may manufacture
them at this
time and we will pay the balance upon delivery and inspection.
Make absolutely sure that they are manufactured properly and we
do not: get one like you sent, to us in this last shipment, I an
out of lamp housings because we need to have these corrected and
remanufactured.
I strongly suggest you get this corrected as
soon as possible or I will be taking legal action to recover my
loses in sales.
Also, I would like to know how you intend to
reimburse Images for:
1)

All of the costs
defective gel,

we have
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had to put

into modifying

your

2}

The
cost
and
labor
manufactured housings,

of

modifying

these

improperly

3)

The Flex Gel, which we still have a lot of, which you sold
us. We cannot use it because of the extreme danger it poses
to the user. We want to return it and receive credit.

4)

We have had several lawsuits going against us for the use of
this gel and, as of yet, we have not informed them of your
role as broker/manufacturer/agent for this product. Please
indicate under what entity you want these actions referred
Associates, American
to for handling, i.e., Macris &
Polymer, Affinity or others.

Please get on these matters as soon as possible.
I would hope
you can see the urgency of them.
Above all, let me reiterate
that you need to conduct your business operations and your
Distributorship
in accordance
with
Images' Policies
and
Procedures and stop interfering with our Distributor Force. Even
if they are First Level to you, you may not test competitive or
even future potential products upon these individuals.
Your
actions are causing Images and our Distributor Force a great deal
of stress.
Sincerely,

/z*

TfTomas Mower
President

March 19, 1991
Via Telefacsimile Transmission
Tom Mower, President
Images International
150 East 400 North
Salem, Utah 84653
Re:

Letter to Mike Macris dated March 14, 1991

Dear Tom:
Since your letter of March 14, 1991, to Mike Macris contains
threats of litigation, Mike has asked me to respond.
With respect to the gel sold to you by American Polymer, the
gel—as sold to Images—is not "defective," and you might be welladvised to avoid disparaging American Polymer's product. Prior to
placing an order for the gel, you indicated that Images had tested
the gel, was aware that the gel did not contain an adhesion
promoter, and-was pleased with the gel. You specifically indicated
that Images would add an adhesion promoter to the gel but declined
American Polymer's offer to evaluate the adhesion promoter for
compatability with the gel and declined to provide American Polymer
with a sample of the adhesion promoter for such evaluation.
American Polymer has no responsibility for any costs Images might
have incurred in modifying the gel to fit Images' specific desires.
If Images is not satisfied with American Polymer's gel, or for any
ether reason, Images may simply stop ordering the gel, just as
American Polymer may elect to stop supplying the gel to Images.
(In the future, I would appreciate it if you would direct any
communication concerning American Polymer and its gel to me
personally rather than to Mike Macris in the context of complaints
you might have concerning Affinity (lamps) or Macris & Associates
(Images distributorship),)
With respect to your resurrection of the issues concerning
the lamp housings and Flex Gel sold under the old agreement between
Affinity and Images, I would remind you that all of the issues,
disputes and controversies between the two companies prior to
January 25, 1991, have been compromised and settled. A review of
the settlement agreement dated and executed on January 25, 1991,
might refresh your recollection on that point. Affinity simply has
no obligation to take back any Flex Gel or lamp housings sold under
the old agreement. Any legal action on the part of Images, as
threatened in your letter, would be considered a breach of the
settlement agreement and would be responded to appropriately.
(Images can either use the heat gun to straighten any problem lamp
housings or grind and reshoot the housings.
Affinity will

cooperate with Images in the latter option by providing its mold
for reshooting the housings, and by obtaining a cost estimate for
that. Please let Mike know if you would like Affinity's assistance
on that.)
With respect to having distributors who are closely associated
with Mike testing gel, Mike has only provided gels to Janielle and
Margie. If you do not want any such testing to be performed by
current Images distributors, regardless of their close association
with Mike, we will honor that desire.
Finally, you have asked Affinity to manufacture and deliver
the- lamp housings ordered under the January 25, 1991 agreement.
Upon receipt of the March 1st payment in the amount of $19,400,
Affinity will do so.
Very truly yours,

^Jon V. Harper
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March 2 9 ,

1991

Mike Macris and Associates
14 Quietwood Lane
Sandy, Ut 84092

y

|g

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

Dear Mike:
The purpose of this letter is to clearly state the matters,
between you and Images International, which need to be resolved.
As you know, Images has temporarily suspended/terminated
your
distributorship and is considering the permanent termination of
your Distributorship. This is in process because:
a.

You have violated your agreement with Images as stated
in our Policies and Procedures.
You have involved
Images Distributors in the testing of your products,
even atter you were given formal written and verbal
instruction not to do so.

b.

There has
not been sufficient activity
on your
Distributorship, either through product
volume or
recruiting to warrant the continuation of your autoqualification of your Distributorship.
You are well
aware of our original agreement on this matter. Images
has kept it's part of th~: bargain, you have not.

c.

Damaging
force.

activity against

Images and

its distributor

We are willing, Mike, because of our past association, to allow
you to respond to these matters.
This letter then will be
official notice to you that you have thirty (30) days from the
date of this letter to bring these matters to resolution and
present a proposal for doing so.
It must be explicit and
specific with commitments, goals and measurable levels to be met.
You must never again approach any Images Distributor with the
purpose of having the Distributor test or market your products.
Should it come to our attention that this has happened, your
Distributorship will be immediately cancelled.
You
may need
to make
a decision
as to
whether your
Distributorship or other business ventures will become of primary
importance to you.
Images will need to see a significant
increase in activity with your Distributorship, both in Product
and Group Volume; as well as first level active distributorships
being formed, growing and remaining actively qualified.

If at the end of thirty days, (April 29, 1991), you have not met
the requirements stated above to the satisfaction of the Images
Board of Directors, your Distributorship will be terminated.
On another matter, I feel I must restate,that we must receive the
twelve thousand lamp housings from Affinity within the next two
to three weeks.
They must be delivered to Images in perfect
condition; that is, free from any and all manufacturing defects.
This is our final word on these
to perform.

matters, Mike.

It is up to

you

Sincere

€f7K^3

Lomas Mower
President
TM/bjs
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